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vRésumé
Les questions abordées dans les deux premiers articles de ma thèse cherchent à
comprendre les facteurs économiques qui a¤ectent la structure à terme des taux din-
térêt et la prime de risque. Je construis des modèles non linéaires déquilibre général
en y intégrant des obligations de di¤érentes échéances. Spéciquement, le premier
article a pour objectif de comprendre la relation entre les facteurs macroéconomiques
et le niveau de prime de risque dans un cadre Néo-keynésien déquilibre général avec
incertitude. Lincertitude dans le modèle provient de trois sources : les chocs de pro-
ductivité, les chocs monétaires et les chocs de préférences. Le modèle comporte deux
types de rigidités réelles à savoir la formation des habitudes dans les préférences et
les coûts dajustement du stock de capital. Le modèle est résolu par la méthode des
perturbations à lordre deux et calibré à léconomie américaine. Puisque la prime de
risque est par nature une compensation pour le risque, lapproximation dordre deux
implique que la prime de risque est une combinaison linéaire des volatilités des trois
chocs. Les résultats montrent quavec les paramètres calibrés, les chocs réels (produc-
tivité et préférences) jouent un rôle plus important dans la détermination du niveau
de la prime de risque relativement aux chocs monétaires. Je montre que contraire-
ment aux travaux précédents (dans lesquels le capital de production est xe), le¤et
du paramètre de la formation des habitudes sur la prime de risque dépend du degré
des coûts dajustement du capital. Lorsque les coûts dajustement du capital sont
élevés au point que le stock de capital est xe à léquilibre, une augmentation du
paramètre de formation des habitudes entraine une augmentation de la prime de
risque. Par contre, lorsque les agents peuvent librement ajuster le stock de capital
sans coûts, le¤et du paramètre de la formation des habitudes sur la prime de risque
est négligeable. Ce résultat sexplique par le fait que lorsque le stock de capital peut
être ajusté sans coûts, cela ouvre un canal additionnel de lissage de consommation
pour les agents. Par conséquent, le¤et de la formation des habitudes sur la prime
de risque est amoindri. En outre, les résultats montrent que la façon dont la banque
centrale conduit sa politique monétaire a un e¤et sur la prime de risque. Plus la
banque centrale est agressive vis-à-vis de lination, plus la prime de risque diminue
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et vice versa. Cela est due au fait que lorsque la banque centrale combat lination
cela entraine une baisse de la variance de lination. Par suite, la prime de risque
due au risque dination diminue.
Dans le deuxième article, je fais une extension du premier article en utilisant des
préférences récursives de type Epstein Zin et en permettant aux volatilités condi-
tionnelles des chocs de varier avec le temps. Lemploi de ce cadre est motivé par deux
raisons. Dabord des études récentes (Doh, 2010, Rudebusch and Swanson, 2012) ont
montré que ces préférences sont appropriées pour lanalyse du prix des actifs dans
les modèles déquilibre général. Ensuite, lhétéroscedasticité est une caractéristique
courante des données économiques et nancières. Cela implique que contrairement au
premier article, lincertitude varie dans le temps. Le cadre dans cet article est donc
plus général et plus réaliste que celui du premier article. Lobjectif principal de cet
article est dexaminer limpact des chocs de volatilités conditionnelles sur le niveau et
la dynamique des taux dintérêt et de la prime de risque. Puisque la prime de risque
est constante a lapproximation dordre deux, le modèle est résolu par la méthode des
perturbations avec une approximation dordre trois. Ainsi on obtient une prime de
risque qui varie dans le temps. Lavantage dintroduire des chocs de volatilités condi-
tionnelles est que cela induit des variables détat supplémentaires qui apportent une
contribution additionnelle à la dynamique de la prime de risque. Je montre que lap-
proximation dordre trois implique que les primes de risque ont une représentation de
type ARCH-M (Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticty in Mean) comme celui
introduit par Engle, Lilien et Robins (1987). La di¤érence est que dans ce modèle
les paramètres sont structurels et les volatilités sont des volatilités conditionnelles de
chocs économiques et non celles des variables elles-mêmes. Jestime les paramètres
du modèle par la méthode des moments simulés (SMM) en utilisant des données de
léconomie américaine. Les résultats de lestimation montrent quil y a une évidence
de volatilité stochastique dans les trois chocs. De plus, la contribution des volati-
lités conditionnelles des chocs au niveau et à la dynamique de la prime de risque
est signicative. En particulier, les e¤ets des volatilités conditionnelles des chocs de
productivité et de préférences sont signicatifs. La volatilité conditionnelle du choc
de productivité contribue positivement aux moyennes et aux écart-types des primes
de risque. Ces contributions varient avec la maturité des bonds. La volatilité condi-
tionnelle du choc de préférences quant à elle contribue négativement aux moyennes
et positivement aux variances des primes de risque. Quant au choc de volatilité de
la politique monétaire, son impact sur les primes de risque est négligeable.
Le troisième article (coécrit avec Eric Schaling, Alain Kabundi, révisé et resoumis
au journal of Economic Modelling) traite de lhétérogénéité dans la formation des
attentes dination de divers groupes économiques et de leur impact sur la politique
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monétaire en Afrique du sud. La question principale est dexaminer si di¤érents
groupes dagents économiques forment leurs attentes dination de la même façon et
sils perçoivent de la même façon la politique monétaire de la banque centrale (South
African Reserve Bank). Ainsi on spécie un modèle de prédiction dination qui nous
permet de tester larrimage des attentes dination à la bande dination cible (3% -
6%) de la banque centrale. Les données utilisées sont des données denquête réalisée
par la banque centrale auprès de trois groupes dagents : les analystes nanciers,
les rmes et les syndicats. On exploite donc la structure de panel des données pour
tester lhétérogénéité dans les attentes dination et déduire leur perception de la
politique monétaire. Les résultats montrent quil y a évidence dhétérogénéité dans la
manière dont les di¤érents groupes forment leurs attentes. Les attentes des analystes
nanciers sont arrimées à la bande dination cible alors que celles des rmes et des
syndicats ne sont pas arrimées. En e¤et, les rmes et les syndicats accordent un
poids signicatif à lination retardée dune période et leurs prédictions varient avec
lination réalisée (retardée). Ce qui dénote un manque de crédibilité parfaite de la
banque centrale au vu de ces agents.
Mots-clés : Models déquilibre général, Structure à terme, Prime de risque, ARCH-
M, Attentes dination.
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Abstract
This thesis consists of three essays in the areas of macro nance and monetary
economics. The rst two essays deal with the analysis of the term structure of interest
rates in dynamic and stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models. The third essay
explores ination expectations formation across di¤erent economic groups in South
Africa.
Interest rates are one channel through which monetary policy a¤ects the real
economy. Typically, central banks implement monetary policy by inuencing short
term interest rates. Theoretically, the interest rate on a long-term bond is the average
of expected future short term interest rates over the maturity period, plus a risk
premium demanded by the holder of the bond to compensate for the risk involved
in holding a longer maturity bond. Therefore, any changes in the target rate of
the central bank and the risk premium a¤ect long  term interest rates, such as
mortgage rates and interest rates on certain durable goods. It is then important for
the central bank to understand the economic factors that a¤ect both components of
long - term interest namely the market expectations about the short - term rates
and the risk premium. For example, recently in the U.S. economy, between June
2004 and June 2006, the ine¤ectiveness of monetary policy to a¤ect long - term
interest rates has been attributed to a decline in risk premium over this period,
which has o¤set the e¤ect of the increase in the target rate of the Federal Reserve
(Fed). In the implementation of its monetary policy, the central bank can more or less
control agentsexpectations through transparent communication. However, the risk
premium is endogenous and unobservable and therefore can not be fully controlled
by the central bank. On the other hand, achieving the goal of prices stability in an
ination targeting framework depends on the credibility of the central bank.
In the rst two essays I explore the economic factors of the term structure of
interest rates and risk premiums. I build a non-linear dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium (DSGE) models whereby I incorporate a range of bonds with di¤erent
maturities. Specically, the goal of the rst essay is to understand the relationship
between macroeconomic factors and the level of risk premium in a New Keynesian
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general equilibrium framework. Uncertainty in the model comes from three sources :
productivity, monetary policy and, preferences shocks. The model has two types of
real rigidities namely habit formation in preferences and adjustment costs in capital
stock. The model is solved by perturbation method up to second order and calibrated
to the U.S. economy. Since the risk premium is by nature a compensation for risk, the
second - order approximation implies that the risk premium is a linear combination
of the volatility of the three shocks. Results show that at the calibrated parameters,
real shocks (productivity and preferences) play a more important role in determining
the level of the risk premium relative to monetary shocks. I show that, contrary to
previous work (where production capital is xed), the e¤ect of habit formation on
the risk premium depends on the degree of capital adjustment cost. When capital
adjustment costs are so high that the capital stock is xed in equilibrium, an in-
crease in the parameter of habit formation leads to an increase in the risk premium.
However, when agents can freely adjust the capital stock without cost, the e¤ect
of the habit formation parameter on the risk premium is negligible. This result is
explained by the fact that when the capital stock can be adjusted without cost, it
opens an additional channel to the agents for consumption smoothing. Therefore,
the e¤ect of habit formation on the risk premium is reduced. In addition, the results
show that the way the central bank conducts its monetary policy has an e¤ect on
the risk premium. The more aggressive the central bank vis-à-vis ination, the lower
the risk premium and vice versa. This is due to the fact that when the central bank
ghts against ination it leads to a decrease in the variance of ination. As a result,
the risk premium due to ination risk decreases.
In the second essay, I extend the analysis of the rst essay by using recursive
preferences (as those proposed by Epstein - Zin) and by allowing the conditional
volatility of the shocks to be time - varying. The use of this framework is motivated
by two reasons. First, recent studies (Doh, 2010, Rudebusch and Swanson, 2012) sho-
wed that these preferences are appropriate for the analysis of asset prices in general
equilibrium models. Second, heteroscedasticity is a prominent feature of economic
and nancial data. This implies that, contrary to the rst essay, the uncertainty here
is time - varying. Thus, the framework in this essay is more general and realistic
than in the rst essay. The main objective of this paper is to examine the impact
of uncertainty due to conditional volatility of the shocks on the level and the dy-
namics of interest rates and risk premiums. Since the risk premium is constant at
second order approximation, the model is solved by the perturbation method with
an approximation of order three in order to get a time - varying risk premium. The
advantage of introducing shocks conditional volatilities is that , it induces additional
state variables that provide an additional contribution to the dynamics of the risk
xpremium. I show that the risk premiums implied by the third order approximate
solution have an ARCH-M (Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticty in Mean)
type representation as that introduced by Engle, Lilien and Robins (1987). The dif-
ference is that in this model the parameters are structural and the volatilities are
conditional volatility of economic shocks and not those of the variables themselves.
I estimate the model parameters by Simulated Method of Moments (SMM) using
U.S. data. The estimation results show that there is evidence of stochastic volati-
lity in the three shocks. Moreover, the contribution of conditional shocks volatility
to the level and the dynamics of the risk premium is signicant. In particular, the
e¤ects of the conditional volatility of productivity and preferences shocks are impor-
tant. The conditional volatility of the productivity shock contributes positively to
the means and standard deviations of risk premiums. These contributions vary with
the maturity of the bonds. Conditional volatility of the preferences shock contributes
negatively to the averages and positively to the variances of risk premiums. As for
the impact of volatility of monetary policy shock, its impact on the risk premium is
negligible.
The third article (coauthored with Eric Schaling and Alain Kabundi, revised
and resubmitted to the journal of Economic Modelling) deals with heterogeneity
in ination expectations of di¤erent economic agents and its impact on monetary
policy in South Africa. The main question is to examine whether di¤erent groups
of economic agents form their ination expectations in the same way and if they
perceive the central bank (South African Reserve Bank) monetary policy in the
say way. We specify an ination expectation model that allows us to directly test
whether ination expectations are anchored or not to the ination target band (3%
- 6%). The data used are ination expectations data from surveys conducted by
the central bank. There are three groups of agents : nancial analysts, businesses
and trade unions. We therefore exploits the panel structure of the data to test the
heterogeneity in ination expectations and derive their perceived ination targets.
Results show that there is evidence of heterogeneity in the way the three groups form
their expectations. The expectations of nancial analysts are well anchored to the
central bank target band while those of businesses and trade unions are not. In fact,
businesses and trade unions put a higher weight on lagged realized ination in their
expectations. This Indicates a lack of full credibility of the central bank.
Keywords : DSGE, Term structure, Ination expectations, ARCH-M, Risk pre-
mium.
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1Introduction Générale
Cette thèse est composée de trois chapitres dans les domaines de la macro nance
et de la macroéconomie monétaire. Les deux premiers chapitres traitent de lanalyse
de la structure à terme des taux dintérêt dans les modèles dynamiques et stochas-
tiques déquilibre général. Quant au troisième chapitre, il traite de la modélisation
des attentes dination de di¤érents agents dans léconomie Sud-Africaine.
Lun des canaux traditionnels de transmission de la politique monétaire sur lac-
tivité réelle est celui des taux dintérêt. En e¤et, typiquement la banque centrale met
en uvre la politique monétaire en inuant sur les taux dintérêt de court terme. Elle
relève et abaisse le taux cible du nancement à un jour, qui est le taux auquel les
grandes institutions nancières se prêtent des fonds au jour le jour. Selon la théorie,
le taux dintérêt sur une obligation à long terme est la moyenne des attentes des
taux dintérêt futurs à court terme entre aujourdhui et la date déchéance de lobli-
gation, plus une prime de risque réclamée par le détenteur de lobligation en guise
de compensation pour le risque quil court en détenant une obligation de plus longue
maturité. Par conséquent, toutes variations des taux cibles de la Banque centrale et
de la prime de risque se répercutent sur les taux dintérêt de plus long terme, tels
que les taux dintérêt sur les prêts hypothécaires et les taux dintérêt sur certains
biens durables. Pour une politique monétaire e¢ cace la banque centrale se doit donc
de comprendre les facteurs économiques qui a¤ectent les deux composantes des taux
dintérêt de longs termes à savoir les attentes des agents sur les taux de courts termes
et la prime de risque. Par exemple, récemment dans léconomie américaine, entre juin
2004 et juin 2006, line¢ cacité de la politique monétaire à a¤ecter les taux dintérêt
de long terme a été attribuée à une baisse de la prime de risque sur cette période qui
a contrebalancé le¤et de la hausse du taux cible de la banque centrale américaine
(Fed). Dans la mise en uvre de sa politique monétaire, la banque centrale peut
plus ou moins contrôler les attentes des agents par une communication transparente.
Cependant la prime de risque est endogène et inobservable et ne peut donc être
entièrement contrôler par la banque centrale. En outre, latteinte de lobjectif tradi-
tionnel de control dination des banques centrales dépend des attentes des agents
2économiques sur lination future.
Les questions abordées dans les deux premiers articles cherchent à comprendre les
facteurs économiques qui a¤ectent la structure à terme des taux dintérêt et la prime
de risque. Je construis des modèles non linéaires déquilibre général en y intégrant
des obligations de di¤érentes échéances. Spéciquement, le premier article a pour
objectif de comprendre la relation entre les facteurs macroéconomiques et le niveau
de prime de risque dans un cadre Néo-keynésien déquilibre général avec incertitude.
Lincertitude dans le modèle provient de trois sources : les chocs de productivité,
les chocs monétaires et les chocs de préférences. Le modèle comporte deux types
de rigidités réelles à savoir la formation des habitudes dans les préférences et les
couts dajustement du stock de capital. Le modèle est résolu par la méthode des
perturbations à lordre deux et calibré à léconomie américaine. Puisque la prime
de risque est par nature une compensation pour le risque, lapproximation dordre
deux implique que la prime de risque est une combinaison linéaire des volatilités des
trois chocs. Les résultats montrent quavec les paramètres calibrés, les chocs réels
(productivité et préférences) jouent un rôle plus important dans la détermination
du niveau de la prime de risque relativement aux chocs monétaires. Je montre que
contrairement aux travaux précédents (dans lesquels le capital de production est xe),
le¤et du paramètre de la formation des habitudes sur la prime de risque dépend du
degré du cout dajustement du capital. Lorsque les couts dajustement du capital
sont élevés au point que le stock de capital est xe à léquilibre, une augmentation
du paramètre de formation des habitudes entraine une augmentation de la prime de
risque. Par contre, lorsque les agents peuvent librement ajuster le stock de capital
sans cout, le¤et du paramètre de la formation des habitudes sur la prime risque est
négligeable. Ce résultat sexplique par le fait que lorsque le stock de capital peut être
ajusté sans cout, cela ouvre un canal additionnel de lissage de consommation pour les
agents. Par conséquent, le¤et de la formation des habitudes sur la prime de risque
est amoindri. En outre, les résultats montrent que la façon dont la banque conduit
sa politique monétaire a un e¤et sur la prime de risque. Plus la banque centrale
est agressive vis-à-vis de lination, plus la prime de risque diminue et vice versa.
Cela est due au fait que lorsque la banque centrale combat lination cela entraine
une baisse de la variance de lination. Par suite, la prime de risque due au risque
dination diminue.
Dans le deuxième article, je fais une extension du premier article en utilisant des
préférences récursives de type Epstein Zin et en permettant aux volatilités condi-
tionnelles des chocs de varier avec le temps. Lemploi de cadre est motivé par deux
raisons. Dabord des études récentes (Doh, 2010, Rudebusch and Swanson, 2012) ont
montré que ces préférences sont appropriées pour lanalyse du prix des actifs dans
3les modèles déquilibre général. Ensuite, lhétéroscedasticité est une caractéristique
courante des données économiques et nancières. Cela implique que contrairement au
premier article, lincertitude varie dans le temps. Le cadre dans cet article est donc
plus général et plus réaliste que celui du premier article. Lobjectif principal de cet
article est dexaminer limpact des chocs de volatilités conditionnelles sur le niveau et
la dynamique des taux dintérêt et de la prime de risque. Puisque la prime de risque
est constante a lapproximation dordre deux, le modèle est résolu par la méthode
des perturbations avec une approximation dordre trois. Ainsi on obtient une prime
de risque qui varie dans le temps. Lavantage dintroduire des chocs de volatilités
conditionnelles cela induit des variables détat supplémentaires qui apportent une
contribution additionnelle à la dynamique de la prime de risque. Je montre que lap-
proximation dordre trois implique que les primes de risque ont une représentation de
type ARCH-M (Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticty in Mean) comme celui
introduit par Engle, Lilien et Robins (1987). La di¤érence est que dans ce modèle
les paramètres sont structurels et les volatilités sont des volatilités conditionnelles de
chocs économiques et non celles des variables elles-mêmes. Jestime les paramètres
du modèle par la méthode des moments simulés (SMM) en utilisant des données de
léconomie américaine. Les résultats de lestimation montrent quil y a une évidence
de volatilité stochastique dans les trois chocs. De plus, la contribution des volati-
lités conditionnelles des chocs au niveau et à la dynamique de la prime de risque
est signicative. En particulier, les e¤ets des volatilités conditionnelles des chocs de
productivité et de préférences sont signicatifs. La volatilité conditionnelle du choc
de productivité contribue positivement aux moyennes et aux écart-types des primes
de primes. Ces contributions varient avec la maturité des bonds. La volatilité condi-
tionnelle du choc de préférences quant à elle contribue négativement aux moyennes
et positivement aux variances des primes de risque. Quant au choc de volatilité de
la politique monétaire, son impact est sur les primes de risque est négligeable.
Le troisième article (coécrit avec Eric Schaling, Alain Kabundi, révisé et resou-
mis au journal of Economic Modelling) traite de lhétérogénéité de di¤érents agents
économiques dans les prédictions dination et de leur impact sur la politique moné-
taire en Afrique du sud. La question principale est dexaminer si di¤érents groupes
dagents économiques forment leurs attentes dination de la même façon et sils per-
çoivent de la même façon la politique monétaire de la banque centrale (South African
Reserve Bank). Ainsi on spécie un modèle de prédiction dination qui nous per-
met de tester larrimage des attentes dination à la bande dination cible (3% -
6%) de la banque centrale. Les données utilisées sont des données denquête réalisée
par la banque centrale auprès de trois groupes dagents : les analystes nanciers,
les rmes et les syndicats. On exploite donc la structure de panel des données pour
4tester lhétérogénéité dans les attentes dination et déduire leur perception de la
politique monétaire. Les résultats montrent quil y a évidence dhétérogénéité dans
la manière donc les di¤érents groupes forment leurs attentes. Les attentes des ana-
lystes nanciers sont arrimées à la bande dination cible alors que celles des rmes et
des syndicats ne sont pas arrimées. En e¤et, les rmes et les syndicats accordent un
poids signicatif à lination retardée dune période et leurs prédictions varient avec
lination réalisée (retardée). Ce qui dénote un manque de crédibilité parfaite de ces
agents vis-à-vis de la banque centrale. Notons que la banque centrale sud-africaine
utilise la politique de ciblage dination (ination targeting) depuis 2000. Ces résul-
tats suggèrent donc quun accent soit mis sur la communication envers les rmes et
les syndicats puisquils sont les principaux acteurs de léconomie qui inuencent la
variation des prix et des salaires.
5Chapitre 1
A General Equilibrium Analysis of
the Term Structure of Interest
Rates.
1.1 Introduction
The goal of this work is to investigate the determinants of the term structure of
interest rates in a New Keynesian Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE)
model with habit formation preferences and adjustment cost in capital stock. The
model features three shocks : productivity shock, preferences shock and monetary
policy shock. We ask how changes in macroeconomic structural parameters such as
preferences, technology or monetary policy parameters a¤ect the term structure of
interest rates. The contribution of the three shocks to the size of risk premia is also
studied.
New Keynesian models are known to replicate many empirical business cycle
facts1 and are increasingly used in many central banks for policy analysis. It is then
important to understand how interest rates behave in this framework because changes
in central bank instrument rate are intended to pass-through the term structure of
interest rates and a¤ect the real economy. The relationship between interest rates
that only di¤er in maturities is an important area of research because economists
believe that important economic facts can be inferred from this relationship. In fact
empirical works have found the yield curve to have economic growth prediction po-
wer over a long period of time (see for example, Harvey, 1991). Second, the term
structure of interest rates contains important implications for market expectations
1See Smets and Wouters (2003) ; Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005).
6about monetary policy and ination forecast.
Long-term interest rates can be explained as market expectations about future
short-term interest rates (the traditional expectation hypothesis theory) and risk
premia. As for the market expectations about future short-term rates, it means that
current long-term interest rates reect investors anticipations about the future mo-
netary policy stances because short-term rates are controlled by monetary policy
authorities. Thus, long-term interest rates reect future expectations of ination and
output in the New Keynesian environment. The risk premium component compen-
sates investors for the risk born by holding a long-term debt instead of rolling over
short-term instruments. In this model, the risk arises for two reasons. First, an in-
vestor fears future capital losses because there is uncertainty about the bond future
prices. Even with risk-free bonds, a capital loss can happen if the holder wants to
resell the bond before maturity time to (for example) o¤set a bad income shock. If it
happens that the resell price is very low, she will su¤er a consumption fall. Second,
ination can erode the value of the bond even at maturity time because the bonds
are nominal. Risk premia are then as important as the expectations part for the cen-
tral bank because they a¤ect the long-term interest rates as well. Unfortunately risk
premia are unobserved and can have undesirable impacts on monetary policy. For
example, a tightening monetary policy e¤ect can be undermined by a decline in the
risk premium component even if the market correctly anticipates the future mone-
tary policy actions as it recently happened in 2004 in the U.S. economy2. Kurmann
and Otrok (2011) nd in VAR framework a weak long-term interest rates response
to a news productivity shock because the responses of the term premium and the
expectations part o¤set each other. It is then important- at least for central bankers-
to understand the economic determinants of risk premia.
It is challenging to study the term structure of interest rates in a DSGE model.
Especially, risk premia are di¢ cult to compute because DSGE models are non-linear
systems and an analytical solution is unavailable for the general case. Numerical
methods such as value function iteration (VFI) or policy function iteration (PFI)
are computationally infeasible because of the large number of state variables. Mo-
reover, previous works have found standard macroeconomic Real Business Cycle (
RBC) models to mismatch simultaneously business cycle variables and asset prices3.
In exchange economy frameworks, some of these puzzles have been solved by using
2See Cochrane and Backus (2007), Rudebusch et al (2007) for this issue called the Greenspan
Conundrumin Finance literature
3Donaldson, Thore and Merha (1990) found that a RBC model with full depreciation of capital
cannot replicate bond risk premium consistent with the data (bond premium puzzle). See also Den
Haan (1995)
7either habit formation preferences (see Campbell and Cochrane, 1999, Wachter, 2005,
Piazzesi and Schneider, 2007) or recursive preferences (Gallmeyer et al, 2008). This
is because with these preferences, risk aversion becomes countercyclical (instead of
being constant) and resources can only be allocated intertemporally through nan-
cial assets. Thus a risk averse investor will require a larger compensation to hold
a long-term bond instead of rolling over short-term bonds. In production economy
frameworks where consumption, output, and investment are endogenous, there are
other channels available for consumption smoothing than the nancial assets. The
agent could either increase his labour or uses investment every time to o¤set unex-
pected bad income shocks given that the cost of adjusting these variables are low.
Thus, the increasing e¤ect of habit formation preferences- on bond risk premia size-
will tend to be weakened in production economies. There is also evidence that the
bond premium puzzle remains unsolved in New Keynesian models even with habit
formation preferences and real rigidities. Rudebusch et al (2008) nd that the vo-
latility of risk premia is insignicant in a New Keynesian model with real rigidities
such as capital adjustment cost and adjustment cost in labour market.
Therefore, we focus in this work on the structural determinants of the size of bond
risk premia. In early studies of the term structure of interest rates in production eco-
nomies, higher habit strength parameter increases the size of risk premia. However,
the capital input factor in the production function is xed in these papers (Rude-
busch et al, 2008, Ravenna and Seppala, 2006). We compare the habit formation
preferences e¤ect on the size of bond risk premia when the capital stock is xed and
when the capital stock can be adjusted costlessly. We also ask to what extent each
shock contributes to the size of risk premia and if the agent prices the risk involved
in these shocks in the same way. That is, we decompose the contribution of each
shock to two multiplicative terms : rst, the size of the volatility of the shock that
captures the quantity of risk it brings with. Second, a constant function of structural
parameters that can be interpreted as price of the associated risk. Thus, macroeco-
nomic factors of risk premium operate through the volatilities of exogenous shocks
(quantity of risk) and these scaling coe¢ cients (price of risk). It is well known that
increasing the size of the volatilities of the shocks will magnify the size of risk premia.
The ability of a DSGE model to generate a sizeable risk premium will depends on the
shock volatilities. Rudebusch and Swanson (2008) nd in a calibrated DSGE model a
small and stable term premium whereas Hordahl et al (2007), Ravenna and Seppala
(2006) nd a sizeable and variable term premium. Rudebusch and Swanson (2008)
attribute the result in Hordahl et al (2007), Ravenna and Seppala (2006) to large
and persistent shocks. It is interesting to address the prices of risk in DSGE models.
First, they represent the relative importance of shocks when the size of volatility is
8controlled. Second, to my knowledge we do not understand yet how the prices of risk
involved in the shocks are related to structural parameters. The impact of monetary
policy actions on the size of risk premia is also studied in this paper.
As an analytical solution is unavailable, the model is solved by perturbation
method and estimate the shocks by Simulated Method of Moments (SMM). Lee and
Ingram (1991), and Du¢ e and Singleton (1993) show that SMM approach delivers
consistent parameter estimates. In addition, Ruge - Murcia (2007) nds that it is
robust to misspecication and computationally more e¢ cient compare to alternative
methods such as Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) and Maximum Likelihood
(ML).
The results indicate that second-order approximate solution delivers a positive
risk premia leading to an upward sloping average term structure. Results also show
that : 1) increases in the ination parameter of the Taylor rule (a more aggressive
monetary policy) lead to decreases in risk premia. Because leaning against the wind
decreases ination volatility and then leads to a decrease in ination risk premium ;
2) preferences shock and technology shock are more important than monetary policy
shock in terms of contribution to the level of risk premium. But this is only because
the calibrated monetary policy shock is very low compared to the two other shocks
volatility. In fact, the contribution of each shock to the size of risk premium is a
result of two e¤ects : the size of the volatility of the shock and the price per unit
of risk involved in each shock. The preferences shock volatility in the benchmark
model is ten time larger than the monetary policy volatility that makes its combined
e¤ect larger than that of the two other shocks ; 3) The price of risk associated with
the monetary policy shock is larger than the other shock prices and is increasing
with the maturity. Preferences shock associated risk price is the least important ; 4)
habit strength parameter has less impact on the risk premia when the capital stock
is allowed to vary over time but the impact becomes important when the adjustment
in capital is high enough to induce a xed capital stock.
The rest of the paper is organized as follow. Section 1.2 presents the model,
Section 1.3 is devoted to derive interest rates and risk premia from the equilibrium
conditions as functions of macroeconomic factors. In Section 1.4 we present the so-
lution method and calibrate the model in section 1.5. Finally, Section 1.6 presents
the results and discusses some sensitivity analyses.
1.2 The Model
The model features a standard New Keynesian economy wherein a representa-
tive consumer derives utility from a composite consumption good and leisure. The
composite good is produced by a representative rm with a continuum of interme-
9diate inputs goods. Consumers can save resources by using nominal bonds or capital.
There is a central banker who adjusts the nominal short-term interest rate according
to a Taylor-type rule
1.2.1 Households
The representative consumer maximizes
E0
1X
t=0
tAt
 
(ct   bct 1)1 
1      
n1+t
1 + 
!
; (1.1)
where E0 is the mathematical expectation given the time 0 information set,  2 (0; 1)
is the subjective discount factor, b 2 [0; 1) is habit strength parameter,  and  are
constant preference parameters,  is the inverse of Frisch elasticity of labor supply,
At is a preference shock, ct is a composite index of a continuum of intermediate
goods, cit; i 2 [0 1], nt is hours worked. We assume internal habit in the composite
consumption index ct dened by :
ct =
Z 1
0
(cit)
 1
 di
 
 1
,  > 1
The parameter  is the elasticity of substitution between the individual goods. As
 !1, the intermediate goods become closer substitutes and the weaker the rms
power on these goods.
Resources can be intertemporally transferred through assets including cash ba-
lances, capital and private nominal bonds with maturities ` = 1; : : : ; L: The consumer
budget constraint isZ 1
0
pitc
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Pt
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Wtnt
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where kt is capital, xt is investment,  2 (0; 1) is the capital depreciation rate, Q`t
and B`t are, respectively, the nominal price and holding of bond with maturity ` ; Wt
is the nominal wage, Rt is the nominal rental rate per unit of capital, pit is the price
of the intermediate good i; and Pt is the aggregate price level. Note that an `-period
bond at time t  1 becomes an (`  1)-period bond at time t: Capital accumulation
is subject to adjustment cost that is a function of the investment-capital stock ratio
xt=kt: The law of motion of the capital accumulation is
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
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where   () is a strictly convex function of xt=kt: For simplicity, we assume a quadratic
function for   with no adjustment cost in the steady state. That is,
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
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  
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In a rst stage the consumer shops for intermediate goods for the composite good
production. Given a level of the composite good, the consumer chooses the inputs
cit; i 2 [0 1] that minimize the total cost
R 1
0
pitc
i
tdi. This implies that demand for an
intermediate good i is given by :
cit =

pit
Pt
 
ct;
and the aggregate price level Pt is given by :
Pt =
Z 1
0
(pit)
1 di
 1
1 
;
The above expressions of demand functions for goods i and price index imply that :
Ptct =
Z 1
0
pitc
i
tdi;
The budget constraint becomes :
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
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The household maximization problem is subject to (1.4) and (1.3)
The preference shock follows the process
ln(At) = (1  ) ln(A) +  ln(At 1) + uut; (1.5)
where  2 ( 1; 1); ln(A) is the unconditional mean of ln(At), and ut is assumed to
be an independently and identically distributed (i:i:d:) innovation with mean zero
and standard deviation equal to one. u > 0 is constant parameter
The rst-order conditions for the consumers problem include Euler equations for
capital, investment, and bonds :
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Et
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
,for `=1,2,...L, (1.8)
where t is the the marginal utility of consumption rt+1 = 1 + RtPt    is the real
return of capital, t+1 = Pt+1=Pt is the gross rate of ination between time t and
t+ 1; and qt is the ratio of Lagrangian multipliers of constraint (1.4) and (1.3), that
is the Tobins q:
1.2.2 Firms
There are a nal good competitive rm and a continuum of monopolistic rms
that operate competitively.
Final Good Producer
The nal good producer behaves in a perfectly competitive manner and takes as
given the prices of intermediate goods and the aggregate price index when maximizing
prots. The nal good is produced using only the individual goods yit as inputs in
the following production function :
yt =
Z 1
0
(yit)
 1
 di
 
 1
;
where yt the quantity of the nal good. Prot maximization implies that demand of
input i is given by :
yit =

pit
Pt
 
yt; (1.9)
Intermediate Goods Firms and Price Setting
Individual good i 2 (0 1) is produced by a monopolist through the following
technology :
yit = ZtF (K
i
t ; N
i
t ); (1.10)
where yit is output, K
i
t is rm i capital demand, N
i
t is labor input and the function
F (:; :) is constant return to scale, strictly increasing and strictly concave in both of
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its arguments and satisfy the Inada conditions, Zt is a total factor productivity shock
that a¤ects all rms in the same way.
The technology shock follows the process :
ln(Zt) = (1  !) ln(Z) + ! ln(Zt 1) + 2""t; (1.11)
where ! 2 ( 1; 1); ln(Z) is the unconditional mean of ln(Zt), and "t is a distur-
bance term assumed to be an independently and identically distributed (i:i:d:) with
mean zero and standard deviation equal to one.
Intermediate good producing rm i 2 (0 1) hires labor and capital in perfectly
competitive markets to produce its good. Firms are owned by households who receive
any prot made by rms at each period.
Prices are set following the mechanism described in Calvo (1983) : each period a
fraction of 1 p randomly picked rms can reset their price while the remaining frac-
tion p cannot. Those who have the opportunity to adjust their price, set it optimally
to maximize their discounted prot while those who cannot adjust optimally, just set
their price to the previous aggregate price level indexed by the steady state ination.
Note that p governs the prices stickiness. The smaller p is, the more exible prices
will be as rms will get to reset their price frequently.
The rm i0s problem is to chooseKit ; N
i
t ; p
i
t to maximize discounted prot subject
to its good demand function, the production technology (1.10) and the price setting
scheme. This can be done in two steps : rst choose the capital and labor input to
minimize the real cost given the production function (1.10) and given the real wage
and capital rental rates. Second choose the price to maximize the discounted real
prot subject to the demand function and given the aggregate price and quantities.
The real cost minimization program is :
Min
Kit ; N
i
t
[wtN
i
t + rtK
i
t ]
s.t yit = ZtF (K
i
t ; N
i
t ) = Zt(K
i
t)
(N it )
1 
The rst order conditions imply that :
Kit
N it
=

1  
wt
rt
(1.12)
Thus, all rms will choose the same capital-labor ratio. Using this relation, the
real cost is given by :
Costt = wtN
i
t + rtK
i
t =
1
1  wtN
i
t
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Use the production function and (1.12) to express N it as a function of y
i
t; wt; and
rt and substitute into the cost function to get :
Costt =
yit
Zt

wt
1  
1  hrt

i
The real marginal cost mct is equal to the derivative of the real cost with respect
to yit and is given as :
mct =
1
Zt

wt
1  
1  hrt

i
(1.13)
Note that the real marginal is independent of i meaning that all rms incur the
same marginal cost.
Now in the second step, rms pick their price pit to maximize :
Et
1X
s=
(p)
st+s
t

pit
Pt+s
 mct+s

yit+s
subject to :
yit+s =

pit
Pt+s
 
yt+s
Notice that when maximizing the prot, rms take into account the fact that a
price set at time t will remain the same with probability (p)s at time t+ s: It means
that when p is large, a price set in the current period will likely remain for a long
period of time. Thus when choosing current price, rms will relatively weight more
future prots.
Replace the demand function in the objective and take the derivative with respect
to pit gives :
Et
1X
s=0
(p)
st+s
t
"
(1  )

pit
Pt+s
1 
1
pit
  

pit
Pt+s
 
1
pit
mct+s
#
yt+s = 0
Solve this equation to get
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pit =

   1
Et
1P
s=0
(p)
s t+s
t
P t+smct+syt+s
Et
1P
s=0
(p)s
t+s
t
P  1t+s yt+s
(1.14)
The above equation (1.14) says that when rms have the opportunity to adjust
their price, they optimally set it as some weighted mean of expected future nominal
marginal costs.
The innite summations implied in (1.14) make the computation tricky because
we do not have a direct recursive formulation of the this expression. To get around
this problem, let dene the following auxiliary variables :
Vt = Et
1X
s=0
(p)
st+s
t
P t+smct+syt+s
Jt = Et
1X
s=0
(p)
st+s
t
P  1t+s yt+s
Then (1.14) becomes
pit =

   1
Vt
Jt
Where the innite sums Vt and Jt have the following recursive forms :
Vt = pEt

t+1
t
Vt+1

+ P t mctyt (1.15)
Jt = pEt

t+1
t
Jt+1

+ P  1t yt (1.16)
When all rms are able to adjust their prices each period ( p = 0), price are set to
markup ( = 
 1) over nominal marginal cost (Ptmct)
pit =

   1Ptmct
whereas when p > 0; the optimal price is set as a markup over expected future
weighted marginal costs. Notice that in the exible price framework, the marginal is
constant and equal to the inverse of the markup.
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Because all rms face the same demand function, they will choose the same price
when reoptimizing at time t, that is pit = p
j
t = p

t for those who are able the adjust
and pit = Pt 1 for those who cannot. Thus the price index is given by :
Pt =

pP
1 
t 1 + (1  p)P 1 t
 1
1  and the ination rate
Pt
Pt 1
=

p + (1  p)P
1 
t
P 1 t 1
 1
1 
where P
1 
t
P 1 t 1
=


 1(1 + t)

Vt
Jt
1 
and

Vt =
Vt
P t
;

Jt =
Jt
P  1t
Ination can then be solve out as a function of

Vt and

Jt from this equation
1 + t =
24p + (1  p)" 
   1(1 + t)

Vt

Jt
#1 35
1
1 
(1.17)
Where from (1.15) and (1.16),

Vt and

Jt evolve according to :

Vt = pEt

t+1
t
(1 + t+1)


Vt+1

+mctyt (1.18)

Jt = pEt

t+1
t
(1 + t+1)
 1 Jt+1

+ yt (1.19)
The production side equilibrium conditions are given by (1.9) - (1.13), (??) -
(1.19).
1.2.3 Monetary Policy Rule and Government
The model is closed with a Talor-type policy rule whereby the monetary autho-
rity sets the one-period nominal interest rate as a function of ination and output
deviations from targeted levels.
1 + it+1
1 + iss
=

1 + it
1 + iss
i  1 + t
1 + ss
(1 i)  yt
yss
(1 i)
exp(mpt) (1.20)
where it is the time t one-period nominal bond interest rate, mpt is monetary in-
novation and iss; ss; yss are steady values of the short term nominal interest rate,
ination and output.
16
1.2.4 Market Clearing and Aggregation
Using the fact that the capital-labor ratio is rm independent, we can get the
aggregate capital-labor ratio
Kt
Nt
=
Z 1
0
Kit
N it
di =

1  
wt
rt
The aggregate supply over rms is then given by :R 1
0
yitdi = Zt

Kt
Nt
 R 1
0
N itdi and the aggregate demand is yt
R 1
0

pit
Pt
 
di:
In equilibrium aggregate demand must equal the aggregate supply or
yt
Z 1
0

pit
Pt
 
di = ZtK

t N
1 
t (1.21)
where Nt =
R 1
0
N itdi .
From (1.21), the aggregate composite index of output is
yt =
ZtK

t N
1 
t
dt
(1.22)
where dt =
R 1
0

pit
Pt
 
di is the price dispersion and introduces a distortion in output
aggregation. The fact that rms choose di¤erent prices in equilibrium can lead to
aggregate output lost when: In fact, rms who choose to increase their relative price
will face a decrease in the demand of their good and then a decrease in their output.
When prices are exible, all rms choose the same price and their is no distortion in
aggregate output, that is, dt is always equal to 1.
The Calvo pricing structure implies that the law of motion of dt is given by :
dt = p

1
1 + t
 
dt 1 + (1  p)
"

   1

Vt

Jt
# 
(1.23)
In equilibrium all the markets must clear every period :
ct + xt = yt
kt+1 = (1  )kt + xt    

xt
kt

kt
nt = Nt =
R 1
0
N itdi
kt = Kt =
R 1
0
Kitdi
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1.2.5 Equilibrium
Denition : An equilibrium is an allocation for the household C = fct; nt; xt; kt+1g1t=0,
(B`t )`=1;::L
	1
t=0
, an allocation for the rm F = fYt; Kt; Ntg1t=0 ; a prices system
ft;Wt=Pt; Rt=Ptg1t=0,

(Q`t)`=1;::L
	1
t=0
such that given k0 and the prices system :
1) the allocations C and F solve the householdsand the rmsproblems,
2) good market clears : Yt = ct + xt +  

xt
kt

kt;
3) nt = Nt = 1;
4) St =
LX
`=1
Q` 1t B`t 1
Pt
 
LX
`=1
Q`tB
`
t
Pt
In the following section, we review the relation between the bond prices implied
by the economic model and the term structure of interest rates, and dene risk
premia. From the bond prices implied by the rst-order conditions of bonds demand,
we derived the term structure of interest rates and expressions for risk premia as
functions of macroeconomic fundamentals.
1.3 Interest Rates and Risk Premia in DSGE Models
New Keynesian DSGE models are well known to be able to reproduce salient
features of macroeconomic data ( see, Smets and Wouters, 2004) but fail to match
simultaneously nancial and macro data. In fact, matching risk premia involved in
nancial assets is a challenging issue for DSGE modelers, yet it is easy to reproduce
risk premia in an exchange economy by adding some real frictions such as habit for-
mation in a standard RBC model ( see Wachter, 2006 and Piazzesi and Schneider,
2006) . With habit formation preferences, current consumption levels a¤ect future
marginal utilities and the risk aversion is countercyclical instead of being constant
as in RBC models. This allows the model to calibrate high steady state risk aversion
with a reasonable consumption curvature parameter (see, Campbell and Cochrane,
1999), and then to generate sizeable risk premia consistent with the data. In a produc-
tion economy where consumption, hours worked and output are endogenous, there
are available channels to the consumer for overcoming bad income shocks, that are
absent in exchange economies. Thus in terms of consumption smoothing, risk averse
consumers claim bigger premium to hold a long-term bond in exchange economies
because they are more exposed to income uncertainty in endowment economy than
in production economy. For example, consumers will be able to work more in produc-
tion economies to increase their income when they face bad income shocks ; whereas
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this channel is absent in exchange economies. As a consequence, the increasing ef-
fect of habit formation on risk premia is weakened in a production economy wherein
consumers can adjust labor or accumulate capital.
We dene the gross interest rate of the one-period bond as
i1;t =
1
Q1t
(1.24)
More generally, the gross nominal interest rate of the `-period bond is dened as
i`;t =

Q`t
 1
` (1.25)
There are various formulas of risk premiums in the literature but Rudebusch et
al. (2007) show that they are highly correlated. The overall risk involved in long-term
nominal bonds is twofold : rst, there is a risk of capital loss in the future in case
of reselling the bond before the maturity date. Because the bond future prices are
not known with certainty in advance, the eventual resale4 price could be less than
the purchase price. Second, there is an ination risk involved in nominal long-term
bonds because ination can erode the bond value in the future. The risk premium
can be derived recursively from Euler equation for bonds,
Q`t = Q
1
tEt
 
Q` 1t+1

+ covt

Q` 1t+1;
t+1
t
1
t+1

; (1.26)
where we have used the fact that the one-period bond price is
Q1t = Et

t+1
t
1
t+1

: (1.27)
The ` period term premium, denoted by TP`;t; is usually dened as the di¤erence
between an ` period interest rate and expected average of short-term rates over the
maturity period, that is,
TP`;t = i`;t   1
`
Et
` 1X
s=0
i1;t+s (1.28)
4For example in case of a negative realization of an income shock somewhere between t and t+`;
an ` period bond holder would like to redeem the bond in order to smooth its consumption
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A similar form of (1.28) in our model is captured by the covariance term of the
right hand side of (1.26). The risk premium we will use in this model, is the excess
holding period return, that is, the return from holding an ` period bond for one
period relative to the return of one-period bond5. We can rearrange (1.26) to get
Et

Q` 1t+1
Q`t

=
1
Q1t
  covt

Q` 1t+1
Q`t
; 
t+1
t
1
1 + t+1
1
Q1t

(1.29)
At time t+1, an ` period bond will become an (`  1) maturity bond such that
the gross holding period return H`;t+1 is given by
H`;t+1 =
Q` 1t+1
Q`t
From (1.29) we have,
Et(H`;t+1) = i1;t + rp`;t (1.30)
where rp`;t =  covt
h
H`;t+1; 
t+1
t
1
1+t+1
i1;t
i
is the holding period risk-premium.
It is easy to show that
TP`;t =
1
`
Et
` 1X
s=0
rp` s;t+s
The term premium is thus the mean of all expected holding period risk premia.
(1.30) says that after adjusted for risk factor, the holding-period return is a
predictor of the one-period interest rate. Note that this covariance term can either
be positive or negative depending on the direction of the covariation between the
holding-period return and the nominal discount factor. When high future marginal
utility- that is the situation where the investor needs more consumption- is associated
with capital losses (Q` 1t+1 is low relative to Q
`
t when reselling an ` period bond at
t + 1), investors will claim a positive risk premium for holding a long term bond
instead of short-term bonds. We can also notice the two sources of risk involved in
long-term nominal bonds highlighted above. First, the term premium is a¤ected by
the covariation between the holding-period return and the real stochastic discount
5Computationally, the excess holding period return requires less complementary state variables
denition than the term premium
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factor keeping the ination rate constant. Second, correlation between the holding-
period return and future ination rate, keeping the real stochastic discount factor
constant, also determines the sign and the size of the risk premia. In the rst case,
the resulting term premium will be referred as the real term premium and in the
second case the ination term premium. The sign and the magnitude of the total
term premium will depend on the combination of these two covariance e¤ects.
In general ination risk premium compensates the bond holder for the ination
risk involved in keeping a nominal asset rather than a riskless real asset. In our model,
such an asset could be the capital stock would the productivity shock be constant
over time and without adjustment cost in capital. Use the rst-order conditions for
the one-period bond to get
Q1t = Et(
t+1
t
)Et(1=(1 + t+1)) + covt


t+1
t
;
1
1 + t+1

;
where the covariance term is the one-period ination risk premium denoted by
Inflpr1t because this conditional covariance is zero when the ination process is deter-
ministic. Similarly the ` period ination risk premium is dened from the ` period
bond Euler equation as :
Inflpr`t = Q
`
t   Et(`
t+`
t
)Et(1=(1 + t+`)) = covt

`
t+`
t
;
1
1 + t+`

where t+` =
Pt+`
Pt
1.4 Model Solution
Notice that an exact analytical solution is not available in this model. Thus,
we use a perturbation method to approximate the solution of the model given the
parameters. Basically, perturbation method consists in taking Taylor series expansion
of the decision rules around the deterministic steady state. For detailed explanations
of this approach, see Jin and Judd(2002), Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe(2004), and Kim,
Kim, Schaumburg and Sims(2008). Perturbation methods deliver a zero risk premium
at rst-order approximation due to the certainty equivalence at rst-order and a
constant risk-premium at second-order approximation.
The standard approach of perturbation method writes the model general equili-
brium conditions in the form :
EtF (yt+1; yt; xt+1; xt) = 0 (1.31)
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where Et is the conditional expectation given the time t information set, yt is
the vector of control variables and xt the predetermined endogenous variables and
exogenous processes. F is a vectorial function of all the equilibrium conditions. The
solution of the model is given by :
yt = g(xt; )
xt+1 = h(xt; ) + "t+1
where h and g are unknown functions,  is constant matrix driving the variances
of the innovations and  is a scaling perturbation parameter driving the size of the
uncertainty in the economy. Given that h and g are unknown, the procedure consists
of approximating the functions h, g around the non-stochastic steady state point
(x; 0) where uncertainty is removed. The approximate solution takes the form :
yt = y +
1
2
g
2 + gx(xt   x) + 1
2
(Iny 
 (xt   x))0gxx(xt   x) (1.32)
xt+1 = x+
1
2
h
2 + hx(xt   x) + 1
2
(Inx 
 (xt   x))0hxx(xt   x) + "t+1 (1.33)
where x = h(x; 0) and y = g(x; 0) = g(h(x; 0); 0) and ny and nx are the number of
control and state variables respectively, I is an identity matrix. gx; hx; gxx, hxx; h
are constant coe¢ cients standing for rst and second derivatives of g and h with
respect to x and  evaluated at the deterministic steady state. Notice that these
coe¢ cients are functions of the structural parameters of the model and that the
parameter  enters the decision rules as an argument capturing the risk factors.
The constant risk premia delivered by the second-order approximate solution is
a combination of volatilities of the shocks. Thus to understand the determinants of
risk premia in DSGE models, it is useful to write the second-order risk-premium as
rp` =
1
2
rpa`
2
a +
1
2
rpz`
2
z +
1
2
rpmp` 
2
mp (1.34)
where rpa` ; rp
z
` ; rp
mp
` are functions of structural parameters and 
2
a; 
2
z, 
2
mp, are the
volatility of preference, productivity and monetary policy shocks respectively.
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1.5 Estimation
1.5.1 Data
We estimate the model using U.S. macroeconomic as well as term structure data
at the quarterly frequency. The sample period is 1962 Q1 -2001 Q2.
The macro data used are per capita real consumption growth, per capita real
GDP growth, and Consumer Price Index (CPI) ination rate. Consumption is NIPA
measures of personal consumption expenditure on non durable goods and services.
Real consumption is obtained by dividing its nominal measure by CPI ination rate.
All the macro data are seasonally adjusted and are collected from the Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis website (www.stls.frb.org).
The term structure of interest rates data are the nominal three-month interest rate
and the ten-year nominal interest rate. The three-month rate is daily treasury bill rate
whereas the ten-year interest rate is daily constant maturity rate. All interest rates
series are from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis website. We obtained quarterly
observations by taking the rst trading day observation of the second month of each
quarter6 (February, May, August, November). In the estimation, we use the spread
between the ten-year and the three-month nominal interest rates. Notice that the
model counterparts of the three-month and ten-year interest rates are one-period
and forty-period interest rates respectively.
1.5.2 Paramaters Estimation : Simulated Method of Mo-
ments (SMM)
We estimate the shocks parameters of the model by the Simulated Method of
Moments (SMM). The number of estimated parameters is ve : the persistence para-
meters of technology (a) and preferences (u) shocks ; and the standard deviations
of the three shocks u, ", mp. The remaining parameters have been calibrated to
the U.S. economy or set in line with the literature.
SMM consists in minimizing a weighting distance between unconditional moments
predicted by the model and the corresponding data moments counterpart. Basically,
the predicted moments are based on articial data simulated from the model while
data moments are directly computed from actual data. This method is appealing
for nonlinear DSGE models estimation because, as shown by Ruge-Murcia (2007), it
is robust to misspecications and is computationally e¢ cient. In addition, Lee and
Ingram (1991), and Du¢ e and Singleton (1993) show that parameters estimates by
SMM are consistent and asymptotically normal. Ruge-Murcia (2012) provides the
6Instead of averaging over the quarter
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properties of SMM estimates for third-order approximation of DSGE models. The
Monte - Carlo evidence on small samples shows that SMM based asymptotic standard
errors tend to overestimate the actual variances of the parameters. Thus, we use a
block bootstrap method to compute a ninety- ve per cent condence intervals for
the parameter estimates.
Since SMM analysis requires stationary variables, we simulate the model on the
basis of the pruned version of the second-order approximate solution proposed by
Kim, Kim, Schaumburg and Sims (2008). The innovations are drawn from the nor-
mal distribution for the simulation. The moments used in the estimation are the
variances, rst- and second-order autocovariances of the four data series, in addition
to the unconditional mean of the interest rate spreads and the ination rate. Because
consumption growth and real GDP growth rates are positive in the U.S. data and
there is no growth in the model, we discard the mean of these two variables. Thus,
fourteen moments are used in the estimation of the ve parameters meaning that the
number of degrees of freedom is nine. The weighting matrix used is the diagonal of
the Newey-West estimator of the long-run variances of the moments with a Bartlett
kernel and a bandwidth given by 4(T/100)2=9 (as in Ruge-Murcia, 2010). The sample
size here is T=158 which implied a bandwidth value of 4.427. We simulate ve times
the sample size (T) observations for the articial series.
Before the estimation test whether the series used in the estimation are stationary
as the theoretical properties of SMM estimates are valid under this assumption. To
this end, we use an Augmented-Dickey Fuller (ADF) and a Phillips-Perron (PP)
unit root tests. The null hypothesis of unit root can be rejected at 5% level under
both tests for all series except the ination rate. However, for the ination rate, the
unit root hypothesis can be rejected at the 5% level under the PP test but cannot
be rejected under the ADF test. But the ADF-statistic is -2.38 whereas the critical
value is -2.39. So, we suppose that the ination rate is stationary.
1.5.3 Calibration
During the estimation, the remaining model parameters have been calibrated as
follow :
The subjective discount factor is parametrized at  = 0.99 to match the average
annual real interest rate of 4%. The consumption curvature coe¢ cient in the utility
function is set to a value of  = 2: This value is in the range of empirical estimates in
the DSGE models literature 7. The habit strength parameter is set to b = 0:65 as in
Constantinides (1990), Boldrin, Christiano and Fisher (2001). The labor elasticity is
set to ' = 2 and '0 is calibrated to match 1/3 of steady state hours worked without
7For example Smets and Wouters (2005) nd an estimate of  = 2:6
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habit in consumption8 as found in the U.S. post war II data. The depreciation rate
of capital is set to 0.025 per quarter such that the steady state investment-output
ratio is 23%. The capital adjustment cost parameter is set to  = 10:
In the production side, the most important parameters that need to be discussed
are the Calvo parameter p which controls the price stickiness and the parameter
 representing the rms power. The model steady state mark-up 	 is given by the
expression 	 = 
 1 . In the data, the long-run mark-up has been estimated to be
about 10% meaning that 
 1 = 1:1: This implies a value of  = 11.
The Calvo parameter or the proportion of resetting price rms p is also related
to the average duration of a price set at time t. Conditional on setting optimally a
price at time t, the probability of being able to reset optimally for the rst time at
time t + j is (1   p)jp. It means that the average duration of a price set at time t
is :
D =
1P
j=0
j(1  p)jp = 11 p which implies an average duration of price changes of
1 year. Thus p can be calibrated by computing the average duration between price
changes. The range of estimates by Bils and Klenow (2004) of average price changes
in micro data is between six months and one year. Setting D = 1 year, that is 4
quarters yields 1
1 p = 4 or p = 0:75:
We compute the U.S. long run money gross growth rate (1.01) and set the steady
state gross ination rate to this value. With the annual 4% steady state real interest
rate, this implies an annual steady state of nominal interest rate of 8%. The non-zero
steady state ination rate implies a steady state of real marginal cost (0.87) that is
slightly di¤erent from the inverse of the mark-up (0.91). The production function
parameter  is set at 0:41 to match a long run U.S. capital share of income of 0.37:
There are no standard values of the monetary policy parameters and di¤erent
papers (Clarida, Gali and Gertler, 1999 among others) have estimated di¤erent va-
lues. In the New Keynesian literature, these parameters are usually chosen in range
which satises the equilibrium stability. I follow Ravenna and Seppala (2005) and
Rabanal and Rubio-Ramirez (2004) to choose these parameters. The ination reac-
tion parameter and the output reaction parameter are respectively set to  = 3,
y = 0:1:
1.5.4 Parameters Estimates
Table 1.5 reports the SMM estimates of the shocks parameters. The Productivity
shock is very persistent and volatile. The estimates of the autocorrelation coe¢ cient
(a =0.981) and standard deviation (a =0.0105) are relatively well precise. The
8with habit formation preferences the implied steady state of labor is about 1/2
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Tab. 1.1: Baseline Calibrated Parameters
parameters description value
 Subjective discount factor 0:99
 Consumption curvature 2
 Capital adjustment cost parameter 10
 Share of capital income 0:41
 Capital depreciation rate 0:025
 Elasticity of substitution among goods 11
p Proportion of rms not adjusting price 0:75
ss Long-run gross ination rate 1:01
 Ination coe¢ cient in Taylor rule 3
y Output coe¢ cient on Taylor rule 0:1
preferences shock is mildly persistent (u =0.553) but very volatile (u =0.047). The
monetary policy shock has been constrained to an i:i:d: process and the estimated
volatility is very low (mp =0.95x10 4). This means that the dynamics of the model
is mostly driven by productivity and preferences shocks.
1.6 Results and Sensitivity Analysis
The results of the calibrated second-order approximate solution of the model and
sensitivity exercises are presented in this section.
1.6.1 The term structure of interest rates
We present in this part the model implied term structure statistics. Note that with
the calibrated 1% of quarterly long-run ination rate, the steady state of nominal
interest rate of 8% (annual). We simulate the model and report the unconditional
mean of interest rates statistics in table 1.6 . As gure 1.7 shows, the model generates
an upward sloping average term structure of interest rates. The model is able to
generate a positive risk premium which leads to the upward sloping term structure.
Table 1.6 shows that the risk premium is increasing in maturity. For example, the 4-
period term premium is 0.5 basis points and the 10-period term premium is 1.8 basis
points (annualized). Notice that the empirical counterpart of the 10-period maturity
is 2.5 years as the model is calibrated to a quarterly basis.
Now, we analyze the impact of monetary policy shock, preferences shock and
productivity shock on selected variables of the model. Because the model is non-
linear (2nd-order approximation), we present variables responses to positive as well
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as negative shock to capture potential asymmetric responses. The blue line is response
to positive shocks and the green line response to negative shocks.
Figure 1.7 presents the impulses responses of key variables to a one standard
deviation of monetary policy shock. As the standard deviation of monetary policy
is 0.003, this corresponds to an annual 120 basis points (40000x1x0.003) increase in
the short-term nominal interest rate. Figure 1.7 shows that an unexpected increase
(decrease) in monetary policy shock leads to a decrease (increase) in consumption
and ination as expected. An increase (decrease) in monetary policy rate leads to
an increase(decrease) in nominal bond interest rates. But the response decreases
with the maturity such that shorter term nominal rates respond more than longer
maturity rates. As a result, an increase in monetary policy rate will induce a decrease
in interest rate spreads. Results in gure 1.7 also suggest that there is no asymmetric
response for relatively small shocks.
Responses to productivity shock are reported in gure 1.7 . The size of the shock is
one standard deviation. A positive (negative) productivity shock leads to a decrease
(increase) in nominal bond yields at all maturities. At the impact time, the magnitude
of the response is the same across maturities. However, the persistence of the e¤ect
is increasing across maturities with the response of longer maturity interest rates
more persistent than shorter maturity rates. It means that nominal spreads do not
respond to productivity shock at the impact time but increase (decrease) after a
positive (negative) productivity shock.
We now consider the impact of preferences shock on the nominal interest rates.
The results are reported in gure 1.7 . This shock a¤ects directly marginal utilities
and the pricing kernel. A one standard deviation increase (decrease) in preferences
shock leads to an increase (decrease) in nominal bond interest rates. As in the case
of monetary policy shock, the e¤ect is decreasing across maturities with shorter term
rates respond more than longer maturity rates.
1.6.2 Shocks contribution to risk premium
In this part we analyze the relative importances of each shock to the determina-
tion of the size of the risk premium. Remember that the second-order approximation
implied risk premium is a weighted sum of the volatilities of the shocks. Thus as
expression (1.34) shows, each shock contributes to the size of risk premia in two
ways. First, the importance of each shock in terms of contribution will depend on its
weighting coe¢ cient. These coe¢ cients can be interpreted as unitary prices of risk
associated with each shock. That is, they capture the intensity of the agents risk
aversion towards the corresponding shocks. Second, shock volatility sizes are impor-
tant to the determination of risk premia. The volatility sizes capture the quantity of
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risk involved in each shock and risk premia are expected to increase as the quantity
of risk increases. The total contribution of a shock is then its unitary price of risk
times the quantity of risk embedded in this shock.
This decomposition of shock contribution to risk premia is important because in
the literature, the ability of a DSGE model to match risk premia statistics usually
heavily relies on the calibrated (or estimated) shock size. The calibration of the shocks
volatilities is sometimes controversial. For example, Hordahl, Tristani, and Vestin
(2007) use a calibrated DSGE model with 2.3% standard deviation of technology
shock. This allows their model to generate term premia large enough to be consistent
with the data. This value of technology shock standard deviation is more than two
times the standard value of 1% used in macro models. This is also the case in Ravenna
and Seppala (2006) where the standard deviation of preferences shock has been set to
8% that is also large compared to the estimated value of 4% in Bansal et al (2005).
Rudebusch and Swanson (2008) criticize the reliance of these two authors results
to such large shock sizes. Furtheremore Ravenna and Seppala (2006) nd that in
New Keynesian framework, rejections of expectation hypothesis are explained by
the systematic part of the monetary policy rather than by monetary innovations as
found in Buraschi and Jiltsov (2006). However, the comparison of the two results is
not clear since the two papers di¤er in many aspects including the nature and size
of the shocks. Thus, for given shock sizes, we can compare di¤erent models ability
to generate risk premia based on the second terms which capture the market prices
of risk.
Table 1.2 shows the total contribution of each shock to the size of the baseline
model risk premia. Preferences shock is far the most important shock in terms of
contribution to the size of the risk premia and the contribution is increasing with
the maturity. This result is not surprising because the calibrated preferences shock
standard deviation is very large (0.04) relative to the two other shocks (more than
10 times) meaning preferences shock carries the largest quantity of risk to the point
of view of the investor. As a consequence, the combined quantity and price of its
associated risk gives the most important value relative to the two other shocks.
Tab. 1.2: Shock Contribution to Risk Premia (Baseline Parameters)
Shocks rp4 rp8 rp10 rp13
Preference 69% 80% 81:5% 83%
Productivity 15% 13% 12:86% 12:7%
Monetary Policy 16% 7% 5:7% 4:3%
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But instead of looking at the quantity e¤ect one can also analyze the price e¤ect
of the risk carried by each shock. That will capture the relative undesirability of each
shock given the same quantity of risk. To address this issue, I now analyze the model
implied coe¢ cients rpa` ; rp
z
` ; rp
mp
` in equation (1.34).
Table 1.3 shows the model implied rpa` ; rp
z
` ; rp
mp
` . It turns out that in terms
of the price per unit of risk, monetary policy has the largest e¤ect on the size of
risk premia meaning that if all shocks were calibrated to have the same variance,
monetary policy would have the most important contribution to the risk premia
with more than 80% for the 4-period bond. This result can be interpreted as follow.
Suppose an hypothetical economy where the three shocks have the same standard
deviations. Then, monetary policy innovations are more undesirable vis a vis the
investor relative to productivity and preferences shocks. Note also that all prices of
risk are increasing with the maturity.
Tab. 1.3: Prices of Risk (Baseline Parameters)
` = 4 8 10
rpa` 0:05 0:16 0:2
rpz` 0:4 0:82 1:05
rpmp` 2:3 2:5 2:57
1.6.3 Sensitivty Analysis
In this section, we do some sensitivity exercises by varying key structural para-
meters in order to understand the determinants of the size of the risk premia. For
example, we want to know how the monetary policy actions part a¤ect risk premia.
Monetary policy and risk premia : do monetary policy actions matter for risk
premia ? That is, how changes in monetary policy parameters a¤ect risk premia.
Results indicate that a more aggressive monetary policy stance, that is, an increase
in the ination reaction parameter, leads to decreases in risk premia. This is because
when the central bank leans against the wind, the ination volatility decreases. Less
volatile ination means less uncertainty in ination and then less ination premium.
An increase of  from 3 (baseline) to 10 leads to a decrease of risk premia of all
maturities. For example, the 10-period risk premium decreases from 1.8 to only 0.5
basis points. The results are plotted in gure 1.7.
Role of habit formation : does habit formation preferences plays a role in increa-
sing the size of risk premia ? To answer this question, I change the habit strength
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parameter from the baseline value of 0.65 to a high level of 0.95 with others parame-
ters set at their baseline values. Habit formation preferences are known to positively
magnify the size of risk premium in endowment economy. In this paper, the habit
e¤ect on risk premia depends on whether the capital stock is x or is allowed to vary
over time. Figure 1.7 plot the risk premium as functions of the habit strength pa-
rameter  without capital adjustment cost and with a very high capital adjustment
cost respectively. Figure 1.7 shows that when the agent can freely adjust the capital
stock, increasing the habit strength parameter has limited impact on the size of risk
premia and the result is actually a decreasing e¤ect. However, when the adjustment
cost in capital stock is set high enough to x the capital stock, increasing the habit
strength parameter has a large impact on the size of risk premia.
This result is important because habit formation preferences are usually found
to magnify risk premia in DSGE models. The increasing e¤ect of the habit strength
on the size of risk premia is consistent with other papers in Ravenna and Seppala
(2005) ; Rudebusch et al (2006) where the capital stock has been xed. The reason
of this result is as follow. In endowment economies habit preferences signicantly
magnify the size of risk premia because a risk-averse investor with these preferences,
fears more capital losses than an investor with standard preferences. This is because
a habit preferences agent cares about not only the level of consumption but the
consumption relative to a reference level increasing the agent risk aversion in bad
times. As resources can only be intertemporally shifted through nancial market,
a risk averse investor will claim a larger compensation to hold a long-term bond
instead of rolling over short-term bonds. In production economies as this model,
there are many alternative channels available for resources transfer. For example,
investors can save by accumulating capital through investment or they can even
o¤set bad income shocks by working more. These additional channels for consumption
smoothing weaken the habit strength e¤ect on the size of risk premia in production
economies. The more channels are available for consumption smoothing, the less
important will the habit parameter has on risk premia. Thus, when the capital stock
is xed, the consumer has now less channels for consumption smoothing and then
the habit strength will have more impact on risk premia.
The prices of risk associated with the shocks rpa` ; rp
z
` ; rp
mp
` in (1.34) are functions
of structural parameters. We nd that the habit strength parameter  e¤ect on
these prices depends also upon the capital adjustment cost parameter. When the
adjustment cost parameter is set to ' = 0; the preferences associated price per
unit of risk also decreases as the habit strength increases. When ' is set at very high
level, the preferences shock price per unit of risk is increasing with the habit strength
parameter.
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1.7 Conclusion
I study in this work the term structure of nominal bonds interest rates in a New
Keynesian framework with habit formation preferences, adjustment cost in capital
stock. The model features three shocks : preferences shock, technology shock and
monetary policy shock. Focus has been on the e¤ect of key structural parameters
on risk premia ; monetary policy e¤ect on risk premia and shock contribution to the
determination of the model implied risk premia.
The model is calibrated to the U.S. economy at a quarterly frequency. Results
show that the calibrated second-order approximate solution delivers sizeable and
positive risk-premia and an upward sloping average term structure of interest rates.
We nd that when the productive capital stock is xed, a higher habit formation
parameter signicantly increases the risk premium. However when the capital stock
is allowed to vary, increases in habit strength decrease risk premium. Moreover,
monetary policy has a huge impact on interest rates premia. Especially, an aggressive
monetary policy leads to decreases in risk premia as it leads to more stable ination
and then to decreases in ination risk. In terms of contribution of the three shocks,
we nd that in the benchmark model, preference shock contributes far more to the
risk premiums followed by productivity shock and the least important.
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Tab. 1.4: Unit Roots Test
Test Statistic
Variable ADF PP
Growth Rate of GDP -6:435  9:242
Growth Rate of Consumption -4:369  7:95
Rate of Ination  2:102  3:148
Interest Rates Spread 10 year - 3 month  3:854  4:274
Note : ; indicate signicance at the 1%, 5% levels, respecively.
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Tab. 1.5: SMM Estimation
Description Symbol Estimates
Persistence parameter of productivity shock a 0.981
(0.955, 0.985)
Persistence parameter of preferences shock u 0.553
(0.303, 0.672)
Standard deviation of productivity shock a 0.011
(0.007, 0.013)
Standard deviation of preferences shock u 0.047
(0.039, 0.061)
Standard deviation of monetary policy shock mp 0:95 10 4
(0:83 10 4, 0:27 10 3)
Note : block bootstrap 95% condence intervals in parenthesis
Tab. 1.6: Model implied term structure statistics, baseline calibrated parameters
Value(%)
TP2 0.1
TP3 0.2
TP4 0.5
TP10 1:8
r 4
I1 8
I2 8.5
I3 8.57
I4 8.87
I10 10
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Fig. 1.1: Average Term Structure of Interest Rates
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Fig. 1.2: Impulses Responses to Monetary Policy Shock
Fig. 1.3: Impulses Responses to Productivity Shock
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Fig. 1.4: Impulses Responses to Preferences Shock
Fig. 1.5: Shocks Contribution to Risk Premia
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Fig. 1.6: Scaling Parameters of Risk Premia
rpa` ; rp
z
` ; rp
mp
`
(rp` = rpa`
2
a + rp
z
`
2
z + rp
mp
` 
2
mp)
Fig. 1.7: The E¤ect of Monetary Policy Action () on Risk Premium (10 - year)
All the remaining parameters are set at
their baseline values
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Fig. 1.8: The E¤ect of Habit Formation (b) on Risk Premium (10 - year)
No Capital Adjutment Cost : ' = 0 With Capital Adjutment Cost : ' =1
All the remaining parameters are set at
their baseline values
All the remaining parameters are set at
their baseline values
Fig. 1.9: The E¤ect of Consumption Curvature (c) on Risk Premium (10 - year)
All the remaining parameters are set at
their baseline values
Chapitre 2
Time - varying Volatility and Risk
Premia in General Equilibrium
2.1 Introduction
As documented by a large number of empirical works, the term structure of in-
terest rates contains important economic information including agentsexpectations
about future interest rates and future ination (see, for example, Frederic Minsky
1990a, 1991). When economic agents are risk averse, the term structure of interest
rates depends on private sector agentsexpectations about future short-term interest
rates and risk premia. Furthermore, risk premia are empirically found to be time-
varying (see, Campbell and Shiller, 1991) and correlated to economic uncertainty
factors.
The time-varying property of risk premia is crucial for the accuracy and usefulness
of the information extracted from the term structure of interest rates since the infor-
mation extracted is usually based on the assumption that risk premia are constant
over time. For example, if risk premia are time - varying, a tightening monetary po-
licy e¤ect on long-term rates may be o¤set by a decline in the risk premium as it was
the case in the U.S. economy between 2004 and 2006. The federal reserve gradually
increased the federal funds rate by 425 basis points while long term interest rates
remained surprisingly low. This behavior contrasted with movements of long term
rates in past monetary policy tightenings and has been viewed by many analysts as a
conundrum. 1 In an attempt to crack this conundrum, empirical work including
Cochrane and Backus (2007), Rudebusch et al (2007) have pointed out that the risk
1See Cochrane and Backus (2007), Rudebusch et al (2007) for this issue called the Greenspan
Conundrumin the nance literature
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premium may have declined in recent years to o¤set the increases of the federal funds
rate. Similarly, Kurmann and Otrok (2011) nd in a VAR framework that long-term
interest rates do not respond to productivity news shocks because the responses of
the risk premium part and the expectations part o¤set each other.
On the other hand, since risk premia are compensation for uncertainty in asset
payo¤s, it is crucial to understand whether di¤erent sources of uncertainty a¤ect
them in the same way if a policy maker has to respond to risk premia variations.
This paper provides a quantitative analysis of the term structure of nominal
bond interest rate where risk premia are time-varying. The analysis is conducted
using a New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with
recursive preferences and stochastic volatility. The analysis focuses on the role played
by the nature of economic shocks in the level as well as the variability of interest
rates and risk premia. This is motivated by two reasons : rst, empirical studies
in macroeconomics and nance have pointed out that time - varying volatility is a
prominent feature of the U.S. post war data and is essential to understand asset
prices analysis and economic decisions under uncertainty (see, for example, Engle,
1995, Hamilton, 2010). On the other hand, Hamilton (2010) shows that misspecifying
the conditional volatility in macroeconomic models can also have an impact on the
mean of the variables. Second, recent studies including Rudebusch and Swanson
(2010), Binsbergen, Fernandez - Villaverde, Koijen and Rubio - Ramirez (2010) have
shown that DSGEmodels wherein households have recursive preferences can replicate
business cycle and asset prices data as opposed to standard preferences.
The term structure of interest rates and risk premia in general equilibrium models
have attracted a large amount of literature. Jerman (1998), Lettau (2003) and Lettau
and Uhlig (1999) among others, have studied asset prices and risk premia in real bu-
siness cycle (RBC) models. Studies including Rudebusch et al (2008), Ravenna and
Seppala (2006), Bianca De Paoli et al (2010), and Hordahl et al (2007) have analyzed
the implications of standard New Keynesian models for the term structure of inter-
est rates. More recently, Rudebusch and Swanson (2012), van Binsbergen, Fernandez
- Villaverde, Koijen and Rubio - Ramirez (2010), Andreasen (2012), Doh (2013),
analyze the term structure of interest rates in DSGE frameworks where consumers
display recursive preferences. Doh (2013) estimates an endowment economy with long
- run risk and stochastic volatility (SV). The ndings of the paper show that time -
varying term premium is more driven by ination volatility shock than by consump-
tion growth volatility shock contrary to previous ndings. van Binsbergen, Fernandez
- Villaverde, Koijen and Rubio - Ramirez (2010) extend Doh (2013) work to a pro-
duction economy but with constant volatility in the shocks and exogenous ination
dynamics. The maximum likelihood estimates of their baseline model indicate large
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risk aversion, large capital adjustment costs, and an elasticity of intertemporal sub-
stitution (EIS) larger than one. The article by Rudebusch and Swanson (2012) uses
calibrated full-edged New Keynesian model with recursive preferences, rms speci-
c capital, and long - run risk. They nd that recursive preferences combined with
long - run risk in monetary policy and productivity shocks are capable of replicating
salient features of business cycle and asset prices simultaneously.
In this work, we focus on the contribution of volatility risk to the mean as well
as the dynamics of interest rates and risk premia in a New Keynesian production
economy with recursive preferences and stochastic volatility. The model features
real rigidities by allowing adjustment cost in capital and habit formation. Unlike
in previous studies (as in Rudebusch and Swanson, 2012), the capital input in the
production function is variable. More specically, we examine the role played by each
source of uncertainty - including shocks volatility uncertainty - in the determination
of the level as well as the dynamics of the risk premium. This is important for
economic stabilization because the results of a policy responses to exogenous shocks
depend on risk premia. As a sensitivity exercise, we compare the habit formation
preferences e¤ect on the size and dynamics of bond risk premia when the capital
stock is xed and when the capital stock can be adjusted costlessly.
It is challenging to study the term structure of interest rates in a DSGE model.
Especially, risk premia are di¢ cult to compute because DSGE models are non-linear
systems and analytical solutions are unavailable for the general case. Numerical me-
thods such as value function iteration (VFI) or policy function iteration (PFI) are
computationally infeasible because of the large number of state variables. Since the
model does not have an exact analytical solution, we use perturbation method that
involves taking a third-order expansion of the policy rules around the deterministic
steady state. For detailed explanations of this approach, see Jin and Judd(2002),
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe(2004), and Kim, Kim, Schaumburg and Sims(2008), Mar-
tin Andreasen (2011). Perturbation methods deliver a zero risk-premium at rst-
order approximation due to the certainty equivalence property at rst-order ; and a
constant risk-premium at second-order approximation. A third-order approximation
(at least) is needed to obtain a time-varying risk premia as observed in the data.
Moreover, some parameters of the model are estimated by Simulated Method of
Moments (SMM) and the remaining carefully calibrated to the U.S. economy at a
quarterly frequency. This method is appealing for the estimation of nonlinear DSGE
models because, as shown in Lee and Ingram (1991), and Du¢ e and Singleton (1993),
it delivers consistent and asymptotically normal estimates. In addition, Ruge-Murcia
(2007) shows that it is generally robust to misspecication and computationally more
e¢ cient as compared to alternative methods such as Generalized Method of Moments
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(GMM) or Maximum Likelihood.
It is shown from the second - and third - order approximated solutions that,
stochastic volatility induces an Autoregressive Conditionally Heteroscedastic in mean
(ARCH - M) type process for the decision rules as in Engle, Lilien and Robins (1987).
The di¤erence between the ARCH - M process in this model and the purely statistical
ARCH - M is that the parameters here are restricted to structural parameters and
the conditional volatility is that of macroeconomic shocks instead of the conditional
volatility of the decision rules themselves. It follows that the conditional volatility has
a rst order e¤ect at third - order approximation and induces additional dynamics.
Thus, as in Engle, Lilien and Robins (1987), the conditional volatility a¤ects the
conditional mean of the risk premium at third - order approximations.
To understand the e¤ect of the presence of stochastic volatility on the term struc-
ture of interest rates, we carry also out an estimation under which the model shocks
volatilities are restricted to be homoscedastic. The SMM estimates under the bench-
mark (unrestricted) model show evidence of time - varying volatility in monetary
policy, preferences and productivity shocks. Moreover, we nd that a higher risk
aversion coe¢ cient, a higher habit formation parameter and a larger capital adjust-
ment costs are needed to match the data under the constant volatility model.
The model predicts positive risk premia leading to an upward sloping average
yield curve. With regard to the levels of the shocks, the ndings can be summarized
as follows. The level of productivity shock has a shifting e¤ect on the yield curve
whereas monetary policy and preferences shocks a¤ect the slope of the yield curve.
As for the volatility shocks the main drivers of interest rates and risk premia are
productivity and preferences volatility shocks with a limited role for monetary policy
volatility shock. The dominant volatility shock is the productivity volatility shock.
Productivity volatility shock a¤ects negatively short - term interest rate ( 1 - period
and 2 - period) and positively long - term interest rates. That means that productivity
volatility shock a¤ects the slope of the yield curve. Preferences volatility shock, on
the contrary, has a negative e¤ect on interest rates for all maturities. However, it
decreases more short - term interest rates than long - term rates. Therefore, positive
productivity and preferences volatility shocks steepen the yield curve. This implies
that time - varying real uncertainty induces additional dynamics in the term structure
of interest rates.
Moreover, a positive productivity volatility shock increases risk premia for all
maturities and the impact is increasing with maturity meaning that it increases
more long - term risk premia than short - term risk premia. On the other hand,
preferences volatility shock has a negative e¤ect on risk premia. A positive preferences
volatility shock decreases risk premia at all maturities and the impact is decreasing
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with maturity meaning that it decreases more long - term premia than short - term
premia. The responses of the term structure to monetary policy volatility shock is
negligible.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents some stylized
facts on the term structure of interest rates. Section 2.3 describes the model and
section 2.4 discusses the derivation of interest rates and risk premia from the equili-
brium conditions as functions of macroeconomic factors. In Section 2.5, we present
the solution method of the model. The econometric method (SMM) is explained in
section 2.6. Finally, Section 2.7 discusses the implications of the model for interest
rates and risk premia and presents the results.
2.2 Stylized Facts of Term Structure of Bond Interest Rates
The goal of this part is to make a quick review of some key term structure of inter-
est rates stylized facts. We use six bond interest rates to compute selected statistics :
the three-month (3m), six-month (6m), twelve-month (1y) maturity interest rates
are Treasury Bill rates while the three-year (3y), ve-year (5y) and ten-year (10y)
maturity interest rates are Treasury constant maturity yields. The raw data used
are taken from the FRED data base of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis and
available at their website (www.stls.frb.org) except the 1y interest rate series which
is from Gürkaynak, Refet S., Brian Sack and Jonathan H. Wright (2007) dataset.
All interest rates data are daily observations at the source from 1962 to 2007. The
sample period is between 1962Q2 to 2007Q4. Quarterly observations are obtained by
taking the rst trading day observation of the second month of each quarter ( i.e.
February, May, August, November) instead of averaging over the quarter.2
Table 2.1 summarizes some key features of the term structure. First, the term
structure of interest rates is upward sloping on average over the entire sample period.
The unconditional empirical means (annualized) of interest rates range from 5.48%
for the three-month maturity rate to 6.83% for the ten-year rate. The average ten-
year - three-month nominal interest rates spread is positive (135 basis points). This
means that, on average, the slope of the yield curve is positive and that long-term
rates exceed short-term rates over the sample period. Second, the volatility of the
yields is decreasing with maturity meaning that the term structure of volatilities is
downward sloping. However, the rate of decrease in the volatility is very low across
maturities. The three-month interest rate volatility is only 18 basis points larger
than the volatility of the ten-year maturity rate. It is clear from table 2.1 that risk
2The results of avering over the quarters di¤er signicantly only in terms of variances. The
variances of the quarterly series obtained by averaging over the quarters are signicantly smaller
than those of taking the rst trading day of the second month of the quarter.
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Tab. 2.1: Selected Term Structure Statistics :Sample : 1962Q1  2001Q3
Maturity (n) 3m 6m 1y 3y 5y 10y
Means
Yields (in) 5.48 5.63 6.02 6.42 6.61 6.83
Excess return(xhprn) - 18 25 102 109 178
Spreads (in   i1) - 15 54 94 113 135
Standard deviations
Yields (in) 2.52 2.44 2.32 2.40 2.36 2.34
Excess return (xhprn) - 2.02 3.87 22.34 21.06 23.70
Spreads (in   i1) - 0.22 0.43 2.01 1.87 1.7
Autocorr 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.93 0.94 0.95
Note : Yield means and all standard deviations are annualized and expressed in percent. Excess
holding period returns and yield spreads means are in basis points. For each maturity n, xhpr is the
return from holding an n-period bond one period minus the 1-period interest rate. xhpr are computed
using the formulae : xhprnt+1 = hpr
n
t+1 -it where hpr
n
t+1 = log(Q
n 1
t+1 )- log(Q
n
t ) and Q
n
t is the time t
price of the n-period bond,
premiums, measured here by the excess holding period return (xhpr), are important
in size as well as in variability. Excess holding period return is increasing in maturity
on average and is time-varying over the sample period. Holding a ten-year bond
for one period is expected to yield on average 103 basis points (xhpr40 = 178 bp)
more than the current three-month bond interest rate. Long-term risk premia are
very volatile relative to short-term risk premia with the volatilities structure ranging
from 2%, for the six-month risk premium, to 23.7% for the ten-year risk premium.
Moreover, interest rates are very persistent with the autocorrelation coe¢ cient of
long-term maturities slightly higher than those of short-term rates.
2.3 The Model
The model features a standard New Keynesian economy wherein households and
rms optimize. Consumers derive utility from a composite consumption good and
leisure. The composite good is produced by a representative rm with a continuum
of intermediate inputs goods produced by monopolistically competitive rms. Prices
stickiness is modelled according to Rotemberg (1982) quadratic adjustment scheme.
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Consumers can save resources by using nominal bonds or capital. There is a central
banker who adjusts the nominal short-term interest rate according to a Taylor-type
rule.
2.3.1 Households
The representative household utility function features recursive preferences as in
Epstein and Zin (1989). Following Rudebusch and Swanson (2012), the value function
is dened as :
Vt =
(
u(ct; nt) + 
 
EtV
1 '
t+1
 1
1 ' if u(ct; nt) > 0
 u(ct; nt) +  (Et( Vt+1)1 ')
1
1 ' if u(ct; nt) < 0
(2.1)
where Vt is time t value function, u is the felicity function (periodic utility func-
tion), Et is the mathematical expectation given the time t information set,  2 (0; 1)
is the subjective discount factor, and ' is the Epstein - Zin parameter (' 2 R).
The periodic utility function features habit formation in consumption and is
separable in labour. That is, u is dened as :
u(ct; nt) = dt

(ct   bct 1)1 
1     0z
(1 )
t
nt
1 
1  

where b 2 [0; 1) is habit strength parameter, dt is a preferences shock that a¤ects
both intertemporal and intratemporal conditions, 0 is a positive parameter, nt is
hours worked,  captures the elasticity of labour supply parameter, ct is a composite
index of a continuum of intermediate goods, cit; i 2 [0 1]. As in Rudebusch and
Swanson (2012), zt is the trend of the economy and the term z
(1 )
t assures a balance
growth path and accounts for non-market labour production activities.
The composite consumption index ct is dened by :
ct =
Z 1
0
(cit)
 1
 di
 
 1
,  > 1
The parameter  is the elasticity of substitution between the individual goods. As
 ! 1, intermediate goods become closer substitutes and the weaker the rms
power on these goods.
The preferences shock dt process features stochastic volatility and is dened as :
log(dt) = d log(dt 1) + u
d
t (2.2)
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where d 2 ( 1; 1) and udt is the disturbances term. We allow the conditional
volatility of the preferences shock to be time - varying. That is udt = d;t"
d
t where
"dt is an independently and identically distributed with mean zero and standard
deviation one and d;t is the time t conditional volatility of udt : We assume that the
process of d;t is dened by :
log(d;t+1) = (1  d) log(d) + d log(d;t) + ddt+1 (2.3)
where d 2 ( 1; 1) is the autocorrelation parameter of d;t; d is the unconditio-
nal mean d;t and d is a positive parameter ; 
d
t is an independently and identically
distributed (i:i:d:) with mean zero and standard deviation one and uncorrelated with
"dt : Notice that modelling a process of log(d;t) instead of the level d;t itself in (2.3)
assures that the standard deviation is always positive.
Rudebusch and Swanson (2012) nd that these preferences combined with long
- run risk in monetary policy and technology shocks are capable of replicating em-
pirical asset prices along with business cycle features3. This is because, contrary to
the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) preferences, recursive preferences break
the linkage between the risk aversion parameter and the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution (IES). For example, in the above specication (2.1) (without habit for-
mation) the EIS is given by 1= whereas the the agents relative risk aversion involves
both parameters  and '. A measure of the relative risk aversion in steady state can
be approximated by :  + '(1   )=(1   b): When ' = 0; the recursive preferences
specication collapses to the standard case of constant relative risk aversion (CRRA)
utility function specication: When  > 1; the lower ', the higher the relative risk
aversion and vice - versa when  < 1:
In addition to consumption spending and labor supply, the consumer must decide
how much resources to allocate in assets including investment and a range of nomi-
nal bonds of maturities indexed by ` = 1; : : : ; L: Resources include labour income,
capital income, and holding of the portfolio of bonds. The consumer period t budget
constraint isZ 1
0
pitc
i
t
Pt
di+ 1t xt +
LX
`=1
Q`tB
`
t
Pt
=
Wtnt
Pt
+
Rtkt
Pt
+
LX
`=1
Q` 1t B
`
t 1
Pt
+
St
Pt
; (2.4)
where pit is the price of intermediate good i; Pt is aggregate price level, xt is invest-
ment, Q`t and B
`
t are, respectively, nominal price and holding of bond with maturity
3Other work that use recursive preferences in macro - nance models include : Hordhal, Tristani
and Vestin (2008), Binsbergen, Fernandez-Villaverde, Koijen and Rubio-Ramirez (2012), Andreasen,
Fernandez-Villaverde, and Rubio-Ramirez (2013)
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` ;Wt is nominal wage, Rt is nominal rental rate per unit of capital, kt is capital
and St nominal lump-sum tax or transfer. Note that an `-period bond at time t  1
becomes an (`   1)-period bond at time t: t is the relative price of investment in
terms of consumption good which is assumed exogenous. The growth rate of t is
deterministic and given by :
log(t) = log(
) + log(t 1) (2.5)
where  is the long-run gross growth rate t:
The law of motion of the capital stock is given by :
kt+1 = (1  )kt + xt    

xt
kt

kt; (2.6)
where  2 (0; 1) is the capital depreciation rate. Capital accumulation is subject to
adjustment costs. To get one unit of capital, the agent has to invest an additional
cost of  

xt
kt

kt which depends on the size of investment relative to current existing
capital stock.   (:) has the following properties :  
00
(:) > 0;   () = 0;  
0
() = 0
where  is the steady state of the investment - capital ratio xt
kt
: Intuitively, these
properties implies that the adjustment cost depends on net investment relative to
the current capital stock. For simplicity, we assume a quadratic functional form for
 (:) which has the above properties as in Andreasen et al (2013): That is,
 

xt
kt

=

2

xt
kt
  
2
where  is a positive parameter which controls the size of the adjustment cost. Given
an investment-capital ratio xt
kt
; the larger  is, the higher the adjustment cost. When
 = 0, there is no adjustment cost and the agent can freely change the capital stock.
When  = 1 there is an innite adjustment cost and the agent may choose not
to invest in equilibrium. Notice that the existence of variable capital in the model
provides the agent with an additional channel for consumption smoothing. Higher
adjustment costs in capital makes nominal bonds riskier and allows the model to
generate higher bond risk premia.
In a rst stage the consumer shops intermediate goods for production of the
composite good. Given a level of the composite good, the consumer chooses the
inputs cit; i 2 [0 1] that minimize the total cost
R 1
0
pitc
i
tdi. This implies that demand
for any intermediate good i is given by :
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cit =

pit
Pt
 
ct;
where the aggregate price level Pt is given by :
Pt =
Z 1
0
(pit)
1 di
 1
1 
;
Using the demand functions and price expressions above, it is easy to show that the
quantity of composite consumption index times the aggregate price index is equal to
total purchases of intermediate goods :
Ptct =
Z 1
0
pitc
i
tdi;
Plugging this expression in (2.4), the budget constraint takes the following form :
ct +
 1
t xt +
LX
`=1
Q`tB
`
t
Pt
=
Wtnt
Pt
+
Rtkt
Pt
+
LX
`=1
Q` 1t B
`
t 1
Pt
+
St
Pt
; (2.7)
Thus, household maximizes (2.1) subject to (2.7) and (2.6).
The rst-order conditions for the consumers problem are derived from a La-
grangian problem. Following Rudebusch and Swanson (2010) the Lagrangian of the
consumer problem is given by :
Vt + Et
1P
t=s
s
n
t+s
h
Vt+s   u(ct+s; nt+s)   (Et(Vt+s+11 '))
1
1 '
io
 
Et
1P
t=s
s
(
t+s
"
ct+s +
 1
t+sxt+s +
LX
`=1
Q`t+sB
`
t+s
Pt+s
  Wt+snt+s
Pt+s
  Rt+skt+s
Pt+s
 
LX
`=1
Q` 1t+sB
`
t+s 1
Pt+s
  St+s
Pt+s
#)
 
Et
1P
t=s
s
n
qt+st+s
h
kt+s+1   (1  )kt+s   xt+s +  

xt+s
kt+s

kt+s
io
The rst order conditions include respectively Euler equations for Vt+1, ct, kt+1,
xt, nt, and
B`t
Pt
:
tVt+1
 '  Et(Vt+11 ') 11 ' 1   Ett+1 = 0; (2.8)
dtt(ct   bct 1)    t   bEt

dt+1t+1(ct+1   bct) 
	
= 0; (2.9)
qt = Et

t+1
t

rt+1 + qt+1(1  ) + qt+1 (xt+1
kt+1
)  qt+1xt+1
kt+1
 
0
(
xt+1
kt+1
)

; (2.10)
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qtt

1   0

xt
kt

= 1; (2.11)
twt = t0dtz
(1 )
t nt
 ; (2.12)
Q`t = Et

t+1
t
Q` 1t+1
t+1

,for `=1,2,...L, (2.13)
where t and t are the budget constraint (2.7) and the value function constraint
(2.1) Lagrangian multipliers respectively, rt = RtPt is the real return on capital, t+1 =
Pt+1=Pt is the gross rate of ination between time t, and t+ 1; wt = WtPt is real wage
and qt is the ratio of Lagrangian multipliers of constraint (2.7) and (2.6), that is the
Tobins q:
2.3.2 Firms
Firms are of two types : a competitive nal good producer and a continuum of
monopolistically competitive rms indexed by i 2 [0 1] which produce intermediate
goods.
Final Good Producer
The nal good producer behaves in a perfectly competitive manner and takes as
given the prices of intermediate goods and the aggregate price index when maximi-
zing prots. Final good is produced using only individual goods yit as inputs in the
following production function :
yt =
Z 1
0
(yit)
 1
 di
 
 1
;
where yt is the quantity of the nal good. Prot maximization implies that demand
of input i is given by :
yit =

pit
Pt
 
yt; (2.14)
Intermediate Goods Firms and Price Setting
Each individual rm i 2 (0 1) produces a di¤erentiated good using the same
technology given by the following production function :
yit = AtF (K
i
t ; ZtN
i
t ); (2.15)
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where yit is output, K
i
t is rm i capital demand, N
i
t is labor input and the function
F (:; :) is constant return to scale, strictly increasing and strictly concave in both of
its arguments and satisfy the Inada conditions, At is a neutral stationary technology
shock, Zt is a productivity trend that a¤ects all rms in the same way. Intermediate
good producing rm i 2 (0 1) hires labor and capital in perfectly competitive markets
to produce its good. Firms are owned by households who receive any prot made
by rms at each period. The trend productivity shock growth is deterministic and
follows the process :
log(Zt) = log(
z) + log(Zt 1); (2.16)
where z is the unconditional growth rate of Zt. The neutral technology shock
follows the process
log(At) = a log(At 1) + u
a
t ; (2.17)
where a 2 ( 1; 1) is the autocorrelation parameter of log(At), and uat is the innova-
tions term. The conditional volatility of uat is time - varying. That is the disturbances
term is dened as uat = a;t"
a
t where "
a
t is an independently and identically distributed
(i:i:d:) with mean zero and standard deviation one and a;t is the time t conditional
volatility of uat : We assume that the process of a;t is dened by :
log(a;t+1) = (1  a ) log(a) + a log(a;t) + aat+1 (2.18)
where a is the autocorrelation parameter of a;t; a is the unconditional mean
a;t and a is a positive parameter ; 
a
t is an independently and identically distributed
(i:i:d:) with mean zero and standard deviation one and uncorrelated with "at :
Prices are set according to the Rotemberg (1982) model. That is, when adjusting
their prices rms face a quadratic cost which is proportional to aggregate output :
p
2
yt

pit
pit 1
1
ss
  1
2
where p is a positive parameter capturing the size of the prices adjustment cost
and ss is steady state ination rate. The parameter p also captures the degree
of nominal price rigidity. Notice that the adjustment costs increase with the size of
the prices change as well as the aggregate output. In the steady state, there is no
adjustment costs.
The rm i0s problem is to chooseKit ; N
i
t ; p
i
t to maximize discounted prots subject
to its good demand function, the production technology (2.15) and the price setting
scheme. This can be done in two steps : rst choose the capital and labor input to
minimize the real cost given the production function (2.15) and given the real wage
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and capital rental rates. Second choose the price to maximize the discounted real
prots subject to the demand function and given the aggregate price and quantities.
The real cost minimization program is :
Min
Kit ; N
i
t
[wtN
i
t + rtK
i
t ]
s.t yit = At(K
i
t)
(ZtN
i
t )
1 
wt = mct(1  )At(Kit)Zt1 N it 
rt = mctAt(K
i
t)
 1Zt1 N it
1 
wheremct is the Lagrangian multiplier of the production function constraint. The
rst order conditions imply that :
Kit
N it
=

1  
wt
rt
(2.19)
Thus, all rms will choose the same capital-labor ratio. Using the above relations
in the cost function, the real cost is given by :
Costt = wtN
i
t + rtK
i
t = mcty
i
t =
1
1  wtN
i
t
Use the production function and (2.19) to express N it as a function of y
i
t; wt; and
rt and substitute into the cost function to get :
Costt =
yit
At

wt
1  
1  hrt

i
From the above two expressions of the cost function, it follows that the real
marginal cost (the derivative of the real cost with respect to yit) is equal to the
Lagrangian multiplier mct and is given by :
mct =
1
At

wt
1  
1  hrt

i
(2.20)
Note that the real marginal is independent of i meaning that all rms incur the
same marginal cost.
Now in the second step, rms pick their price pit to maximize :
Et
1X
s=t
s
t+s
t
"
pit+s
Pt+s
 mct+s   p
2
yt+s
yit+s

pit+s
pit+s 1
1
ss
  1
2#
yit+s
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subject to :
yit+s =

pit+s
Pt+s
 
yt+s
After replacing the demand function constraint in the objective function, the rst
order condition with respect to pit is given by :
yt
Pt

pit
Pt
 
   yt
Pt

pit
Pt
  1 
pit
Pt
 mct

  p yt
pit 1

pit
pit 1
1
ss
  1

1
ss
+
pEt

t+1
t

pit+1
pit
1
ss
  1

pit+1
pit
yt+1
pit
1
ss

= 0
Since all rms face the same demand function and marginal cost, they will choose
the same price in equilibrium for the same quantity of output. That is, we have a
symmetric case where pit = Pt and y
i
t = yt 8t: With the symmetry assumption, the
rst order condition gives the dynamics of ination as :
mct =
   1

+
p

t
ss

t
ss
  1

   p

Et

t+1
t

t
ss
  1

t+1
ss
yt+1
yt

(2.21)
The production side equilibrium conditions are given by equations (2.14) - (2.21).
2.3.3 Monetary Policy Rule and Government
The government issues the nominal bonds and is able to control the short term
nominal interest rate through open market operations. Bond issues are consistent
with a zero decit. The government budget constraint is given by :
St
Pt
=
LX
`=1
Q` 1t B
`
t 1
Pt
 
LX
`=1
Q`tB
`
t
Pt
The model is closed with a Talor-type policy rule whereby the monetary autho-
rity sets the one-period nominal interest rate as a function of ination and output
deviations from targeted levels.
1 + it
1 + iss
=

1 + it 1
1 + iss
i  1 + t
1 + ss
(1 i)  yt
zt eyss
(1 i)y
exp(umpt ) (2.22)
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where it is the time t one-period nominal bond interest rate, u
mp
t is monetary innova-
tion, i; ; y are constant policy parameters, and i
ss; ss; eyss are steady values of
the short term nominal interest rate, ination and the stationary level of output yt
zt
respectively. The conditional volatility of umpt is time - varying with u
mp
t = m;t"
mp
t
where m;t is the conditional volatility of u
mp
t . The conditional volatility process is
dened as :
log(m;t+1) = (1  m) log(mp) + m log(m;t) + mmpt+1 (2.23)
where m 2 ( 1; 1) and mp, m are positive parameters ; mpt is an indepen-
dently and identically distributed with mean zero and standard deviation one and
uncorrelated with "mpt :
2.3.4 Market Clearing and Aggregation
Using the symmetry assumption the aggregate output is given by :
yt = At(Kt)
(ZtNt)
1 
In equilibrium all markets must clear every period :
ct +
 1
t xt = yt
kt+1 = (1  )kt + xt   2

xt
kt
  
2
kt
nt = Nt =
R 1
0
N itdi
kt = Kt =
R 1
0
Kitdi
St =
LX
`=1
Q` 1t B`t 1
Pt
 
LX
`=1
Q`tB
`
t
Pt
2.3.5 Stationary Equilibrium
Since there is growth in the model due to productivity and investment shock
growths, we transform the system by dividing each nonstationary variable by the
relevant growth rate. Following Altig, Christiano, Eichenbaum (2005) and Andreasen
et al (2013) the economy technology progress trend is dened as zt = 

1 
t zt: That
means that aggregate variables such as consumption, output, real wage will grow at
the growth rate of zt whereas investment, and capital grow at the growth rate of
tz

t : We denote the transformed stationary variables with a ~
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The stationary system is dened as : ect = ctzt ; eyt = ytzt ; ext = xttzt ; ewt = wtzt ;ekt+1 = kttzt ; eqt = qtt; ert = rtt; eVt = Vtz1 t ; et = ttz t : Thus, the stationary
equilibrium is given by : 
Et(Vt+1
1 ')
Vt+1
 '
1 '
=
t+1
t
(2.24)
et = dt(ect   bect 1 zt 1
zt
)    bEt

dt+1
t+1
t
(ect+1 zt+1
zt
  bect)  ; (2.25)
eqt = Et(et+1et

zt+1
zt
  t+1
t
t
t+1
"ert+1 + eqt+1(1  ) + eqt+1 (ext+1ekt+1 z

t+1
zt
t+1
t
)
#)
 
Et
(et+1et

zt+1
zt
  t+1
t
t
t+1
"eqt+1 zt+1
zt
t+1
t
ext+1ekt+1 0(ext+1ekt+1 z

t+1
zt
t+1
t
)
#)
; (2.26)
eqt+1 1   0 xt
kt
zt
zt 1
t
t 1

= 1; (2.27)
et ewt = 0dtnt  (2.28)
Q`t = Et
 et+1et

zt+1
zt
  t+1
t
Q` 1t+1
t+1
!
,for `=1,2,...L, (2.29)
ewt = mct(1  )At(ekt)nt 
ert = mctAt(ekt) 1nt1 
mct =
   1

+
p

t
ss

t
ss
  1

  p

Et
(et+1et

zt+1
zt
  t+1
t

t
ss
  1

t+1
ss
eyt+1eyt z

t+1
zt
)
(2.30)
1 + it
1 + iss
=

1 + it 1
1 + iss
i  1 + t
1 + ss
(1 i)  eytfyss
(1 i)
exp(mpt) (2.31)
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eyt = ect + ext (2.32)
kt+1 = (1 )kt

zt+1
zt
t+1
t
 1
+xt  
2

xt
kt
zt
zt 1
t
t 1
  
2
kt

zt+1
zt
t+1
t
 1
(2.33)
In the following section, we review the relation between the bond prices implied
by the economic model and the term structure of interest rates, and dene risk pre-
mia. Thus, interest rates and risk premia are derived as functions of macroeconomic
fundamentals.
2.4 Interest Rates and Risk Premia in DSGE Models
In this section, we provide an explicit relationship between bond interest rates,
risk premia and prices derived from the model. The intention is only to be expli-
cit about the variables used in the empirical analysis. Following the literature, the
interest rate (gross) of a one-period bond is given by
i1t =
1
Q1t
(2.34)
More generally, the gross nominal interest rate of the `-period bond is dened as
i`t =

Q`t
 1
` (2.35)
Here the overall risk involved in long-term nominal bonds is twofold : rst, there
is a risk of capital loss in the future in case the investor wants to sell the bond before
the maturity date. Because the bond future prices are not known with certainty in
advance, the eventual resale4 price might be less than the purchase price. Second,
there is an ination risk involved in nominal long-term bonds because ination can
erode the bond value in the future. The risk premium can be derived recursively by
rewriting the Euler equation of bonds demand as,
Q`t = Q
1
tEt
 
Q` 1t+1

+ covt
 
Q` 1t+1;
et+1et

zt+1
zt
  t+1
t
1
t+1
!
; (2.36)
where we used the fact that the one-period bond price is
4For example in case of a negative realization of an income shock somewhere between t and t+`;
an ` period bond holder would like to redeem the bond in order to smooth its consumption
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Q1t = Et
 et+1et
et+1et

zt+1
zt
  t+1
t
1
t+1
!
: (2.37)
There are various formulas of risk premiums in the literature but Rudebusch et
al. (2007) show that all denitions are highly correlated. For example, the ` period
term-premium, denoted by TP`;t; is usually dened as the di¤erence between an
` period interest rate and expected average of short-term rates over the maturity
period, that is,
TP`;t = i
`
t  
1
`
Et
` 1X
s=0
i1;t+s (2.38)
In this paper, the risk premium is dened as the excess holding period return,
that is, the return from holding an ` period bond for one period relative to the
current return of the one-period bond5. To obtain an expression for risk premium,
we rewrite (2.36) as
Et

Q` 1t+1
Q`t

=
1
Q1t
  covt
"
Q` 1t+1
Q`t
; 
et+1et

zt+1
zt
  t+1
t
1
1 + t+1
1
Q1t
#
(2.39)
Assume that an investor buys an ` period bond at time t and holds it just for
one period. At time t+1, an ` period bond will be sold as an (` 1) maturity bond.
Thus, the gross return of holding an ` period for one period H`;t+1 is given by :
H`;t+1 =
Q` 1t+1
Q`t
Plugging the previous expression in (2.39) the Euler equation of the ` period
bond becomes
Et(H`;t+1) = i1;t + rp
`
t (2.40)
where rp`t =  covt

H`;t+1; 
et+1et
h
zt+1
zt
i 
t+1
t
1
1+t+1
i1;t

is the holding period risk-
premium. It is easy to show that the two denitions of risk premia are related as
5Computationally, the excess holding period return requires less complementary state variables
denition than the term premium
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TP`;t =
1
`
Et
` 1X
s=0
rp` st+s;
meaning that the term-premium is an average of all expected holding period
risk-premia over the maturity period of the bond.
Equation (2.40) means that after adjusted for risk factor, the holding-period
return is a predictor of the one-period interest rate. Note that the covariance term
in the risk premium expression can either be positive or negative depending on the
sign of the covariation between the holding-period return and the nominal discount
factor. When high future marginal utilities- that is situations where investors need
more consumption- tend to be associated with capital losses (Q` 1t+1 is low relative
to Q`t when reselling an ` period bond at t + 1), investors will claim a positive
risk premium for holding a long-term bond instead of short-term bonds. Moreover,
the two sources of risk in long-term nominal bonds highlighted above are present in
the risk premium formula. First, the risk premium is a¤ected by the co-movement
between the holding-period return and the real stochastic discount factor keeping the
ination rate constant. Second, the correlation between the holding-period return and
the future ination rate, keeping the real stochastic discount factor constant, also
determines the sign and the size of the risk premia. In the rst case, the resulting
risk premium will be referred as the real risk premium and in the second case the
ination risk premium. The sign and the magnitude of the total risk premium will
depend on the combination of these two covariance e¤ects.
2.5 Model Solution
The primary focus of this paper is to understand the role played by each source
of uncertainty in level and variance of interest rates and risk premia. Notice that an
exact analytical solution is not available in this model. Thus, we use a perturbation
method to approximate the solution of the model given the parameters. Basically,
perturbation method consists in taking Taylor series expansion of the decision rules
around the deterministic steady state. For detailed explanations of this approach, see
Jin and Judd(2002), Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe(2004), and Kim, Kim, Schaumburg
and Sims(2008). At rst - order approximations, time - varying uncertainty shocks
do not a¤ect the decision rules and risk premia are equal to zero due to certainty
equivalence at rst-order. At second-order approximations, only the average level of
shocks volatility enter in the decisions and risk premia are constant. Time-varying
uncertainty e¤ects the dynamics of risk premium at orders of approximation greater
than three. Therefore, we solve and estimate the model at third - order approxi-
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mation. The third-order approximation solution properties are provided by Martin
Andreasen6 et al (2013). Due to the large number of variables involving the term
structure of interest rates, computing the third-order directly in Matlab requires a
lot of computer memory. Thus, we use Dynare (version 4.4.3) to obtain the third-
order solution.7
The standard approach of perturbation method writes the model general equili-
brium conditions in the form :
EtF (yt+1; yt; xt+1; xt) = 0 (2.41)
where Et is the conditional expectation given the time t information set, yt is
the vector of control variables and xt the predetermined endogenous variables and
exogenous processes. F is a vectorial function of all the equilibrium conditions. In
this model the control variables vector is composed of ect; eyt; ext; ewt; ekt+1; et; eqt; ert;eVt; t; mct;i`t	`=L`=1 , whereas the state vector contains kt; At; dt;  t; mpt; zt = ztzt 1 ;
t =
t
t 1
; dt ; 
a
t ; 
mp
t ; ct 1; i
1
t 1
The solution of the model is given by :
yt = g(xt; ) (2.42)
xt+1 = h(xt; ) + "t+1 (2.43)
where h and g are unknown functions, "t is the innovations vector of the exoge-
nous shocks,  is a constant matrix driving the variances of the innovations and  is
a scaling perturbation parameter driving the size of the uncertainty in the economy.
Given that h and g are unknown, the procedure consists of approximating the func-
tions h and g around the non-stochastic steady state point (x; 0) where uncertainty
is removed. Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe(2004) show that h; g; hx; and gx evalua-
ted at the approximated point (steady) are equal to zero. Martin Andreasen (2011)
proved that at the steady state point hxx = 0, gxx = 0. Moreover, in the case of
symmetric shocks (for example normal distribution), the terms h = 0, g = 0.
However in the case of non-symmetric shocks (rare disaster shocks for example),
these coe¢ cients may be di¤erent from zero.8
The approximate solution takes the form :
6See also Ruge - Murcia(2010)
7Dynare software package is available at http ://www.dynare.org. For detailed explanations see
Michel Julliard(2004)
8These results are also shown in Ruge - Murcia (2012)
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yt = y +
1
2
g
2 + gx(xt   x) + 1
2
[gxx]12 [xt   x]
1 [xt   x]2 +
1
6
[gxxx]123 [xt   x]
1 [xt   x]2 [xt   x]3 +
3
6
[gx]3 
2 [xt   x]3 + 1
6
g
3 (2.44)
xt+1 = x+
1
2
h
2 +
1
6
h
3 + hx(xt   x) + 1
2
[hxx]12 [xt   x]
1 [xt   x]2 +
1
6
[hxxx]123 [xt   x]
1 [xt   x]2 [xt   x]3 + 3
6
[hx]3 
2 [xt   x]3 + "t+1
(2.45)
where x = h(x; 0) and y = g(x; 0) = g(h(x; 0); 0) and ny and nx are the number of
control and state variables respectively, 1; 2; 3 = 1; :::nx. gx; hx; gxx, hxx; gxxx, hxxx
h; ; g; hx; gx; h, g are constant coe¢ cients standing for rst, second,
and third derivatives of g and h with respect to x and  evaluated at the deterministic
steady state. Notice that these coe¢ cients are functions of the structural parameters
of the model and that the parameter  enters the decision rules as an argument
capturing the risk factors. Also, the conditional volatilities of the innovations in the
state vector are time - varying and enter directly in the decision rules.
Since the third order solution is computed using Dynare, the decision rules are
expressed as functions of (xt 1; "t; ) instead of (xt; ). Notice that the above re-
presentation (2.42) and (2.43) of the solution can be recovered from the Dynare
representation by redening the state vector as vt = (xt 1; "t) as in Andreasen et al
(2013). Then, it is easy to show that the equilibrium solution is expressed as :
yt = g(vt; )
vt+1 = h(vt; ) + 
~
"t+1
where h(vt; ) = (h(vt; ); 0)0 and
~
 = (; 0)0:
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2.6 Econometric Analysis
2.6.1 Data
The model is estimated using U.S. macroeconomic as well as term structure data
at the quarterly frequency. The sample period is 1962 Q1 -2007 Q4.
The macro data used are per capita real consumption growth, per capita real
investment growth, real wage ination rate, per capita hours worked, and Consu-
mer Price Index (CPI) ination rate. The consumption variable is obtained by ad-
ding NIPA measures of personal consumption expenditure on nondurable goods and
services. On the other hand, investment is the sum of private xed nonresidential
investment and personal expenditure on durable goods. Per capita real variables
(investment and consumption) are obtained by dividing these variables by the quar-
terly CPI and the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) estimate of the mid-month
U.S. population. We use average weekly (per capita) hours of production and non-
supervisory employees in the manufacturing sector as a measure of the model hours
worked. Since the time endowment is normalized to one in the model, we assume a
time endowment of 120 (5 24) which corresponds to ve working days per week
and divide each observation of the original hours worked series by 120. All the macro
data are seasonally adjusted and are collected from the Federal Reserve Bank of St.
Louis website (www.stls.frb.org) and .
The term structure of interest rates data are the three-month nominal interest
rate, the ten-year nominal interest rate as well as the ten - year excess holding per-
iod return. Notice that, the model counterparts of the three-month nominal interest
rate, the ten-year nominal interest rate as well as the ten - year are i1t ; i
40
t and rp
40
t
respectively: The three-month rate is daily treasury bill rate whereas the ten-year
interest rate is daily constant maturity rate and are taken from the Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis website. Quarterly observations are obtained by taking the rst
trading day observation of the second month of each quarter9 (February, May, Au-
gust, November). Excess holding period return series is computed using continuously
- compounded yields from Gürkaynak, Refet S., Brian Sack and Jonathan H. Wright
(2007) dataset. In all, eight data series have been used in the estimation.
2.6.2 Paramaters Estimation : Simulated Method of Mo-
ments (SMM)
We estimate the parameters of the model by Simulated Method of Moments
(SMM). This method consists in minimizing a weighting distance between uncondi-
9Instead of averaging over the quarter
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tional moments predicted by the model and their corresponding data counterparts.
Basically, the predicted moments are based on articial series simulated from the
model while the data moments are directly computed from actual data.
Let  2  be the unknown k1 parameters vector of the DSGE model. Suppose,
we have T observations of stationary and ergodic economic data series fqtg : Lets
denote by
1
T
TP
t=1
m(qt) a set of p moments computed from the data where p  k10. For given
values of parameters  we can compute the same set of moments from articial data
simulated from the model. Assume that the sample size of the simulated data is T
and denote these moments by :
1
T
TP
t=1
m(qt()) where   1 is an integer.
The SMM estimator of  is dened by :
bSMM = argmax
2
M()0 W M()
where M() = 1
T
TP
t=1
m(qt)   1T
TP
t=1
m(qt()) and W is a p  p positive-denite
weighting matrix. Thus, the SMM estimator bSMM is the value of the parameters
vector  that minimizes the distance between the set of data moments and those
implied by the model. As Shown in Ruge - Murcia (2007), the asymptotic distribution
of bSMM is normal and the asymptotic variance matrix is given by :
(1 +
1

)

J
0
WJ
 1
J
0
WSWJ

J
0
WJ
 1
(2.46)
where J = E

@m(qt())
@

and S is the long-run variance matrix of the sample
moments vector. Notice that when the number of simulated samples  ! +1; the
SMM asymptotic variance matrix converges to that of the Generalized Method of
Moments (GMM).
Simulated method of moments is suitable for large nonlinear DSGE models es-
timation because it provides consistent and asymptotically normal parameter es-
timates.11 Moreover, Ruge-Murcia (2007) shows that SMM is generally robust to
misspecication and is computationally more e¢ cient than alternative methods.12
10As mentionned in Ruge-Murcia (2010) this is a necessary condition for identication
11See, Lee and Ingram (1991), Du¢ e and Singleton (1993).
12For example, the paper shows that the computing time of SMM is less than tthat of GMM and
Maximum Likelihood. Moreover, the objective function is easier to compute under SMM.
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Ruge-Murcia (2012) provides the properties of SMM estimates for third-order ap-
proximation of DSGE models. The Monte - Carlo evidence on small samples shows
that SMM based asymptotic standard errors tend to overestimate the actual va-
riances of the parameters. However due to the large number of variables and parame-
ters in this model, to obtain a bootstrap type standard errors will be computationally
very expensive at third - order approximation. Thus, we approximate the standard
errors of the estimates by the estimates asymptotic variance matrix in (2.46).
Articial data are obtained by simulating the model based on the pruned ver-
sion of the third-order approximate solution proposed by Martin Andreasen, Jesús
Fernández-Villaverde and Juan Rubio-Ramírez (2013). We assume normal distri-
bution of the innovations in the simulations. Thirty-two moments are used in the
estimation : the variances, rst- and second-order autocovariances as well as the un-
conditional means of the eight data series. The weighting matrix used is the diagonal
of Newey-West estimator of long-run variances of the moments with a Bartlett kernel
and bandwidth given by the integer of 4(T/100)2=9 where T is the sample size. The
sample size here is T=182 which implied a bandwidth value of 4.569. The number of
the simulated observations is ten times the sample size T.
The number of estimated parameters is twenty : ve preferences parameters
; b; ; '; ; ve shock levels parameters including the persistence (a; d) and un-
conditional standard deviation (a; d; mp) parameters of productivity, preferences
and monetary policy shocks respectively ; six conditional volatility shocks parameters
including the persistence (a ; d ; m) and standard deviation (a ; d ; m) para-
meters of productivity, preferences and monetary policy shocks, respectively ; three
monetary policy reaction parameters, ; y; i; and the capital adjustment cost pa-
rameter : Thus  =[, b, , ', , , , y, i, a, d, m, a, d , m, a; d,
mp; a, d , m]: Since the number of moments used is thirty - two, the number
of degree of freedom is twelve (= 32  20): The remaining parameters are di¢ cult to
identify and thus have been calibrated in the next subsection.
Before the estimation test whether the series used in the estimation are stationary
as the theoretical properties of SMM estimates are valid under this assumption. To
this end, we use an Augmented-Dickey Fuller (ADF) and a Phillips-Perron (PP)
unit root tests. The null hypothesis of unit root can be rejected at 5% level under
both tests for all series except the ination rate. However, for the ination rate, the
unit root hypothesis can be rejected at the 5% level under the PP test but cannot
be rejected under the ADF test. But the ADF-statistic is -2.38 whereas the critical
value is -2.39. So, we suppose that the ination rate is also stationary.
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2.6.3 Calibration
During the estimation, the remaining model parameters have been calibrated as
follows :
The production function parameter is set at  = 0:3 to match the share of capi-
tal income in the U.S. data. Notice that in the model, the unconditional growth
rate of consumption is given by the unconditional growth rate of the economy
technology progress zt ; which from the denition of z

t ; is given by : log(
z) =
log(z) + 
1  log(
) where z and  are the unconditional growth rate of z and
, respectively. The unconditional growth rate of investment is given by : log(z

)+
log(). Thus, given , z and  are calibrated to match the sample growth rates
of consumption (1:005045) and investment (1:006068).
The disutility parameter 0 is calibrated to match a steady state hours worked
of nss = 0:34 as in the data.
From the capital accumulation equation, the depreciation rate of capital is set as
 = 1  (1  xss
kss
)z

: The investment - capital ratio xss
kss
is xed at 0:025, and given
z

; ;  = 0:02: The parameter  in the capital adjustment cost function is then
set such that there is no adjustment cost in the steady state. That is,  = xss
kss
z

:
Since there is no prices adjustment cost in the steady state, the model steady
state mark-up 	 is given by the expression 	 = 
 1 :  is set such that the long - run
mark - up (gross) 	 = 1:1 ; that is,  = 11:
The Rotemberg (1982) prices adjustment cost parameter p is set such that the
rst order ination dynamics is equivalent to that of a model with Calvo (1983)
pricing. That is, p =
( 1)
(1 )(1 ) where  is the Calvo parameter,  is the elasticity
of substitution among goods and  is the subjective discount factor. The Calvo
parameter is set at 0:75 to match an average price duration of 4 quarters and the
subjective discount factor  is estimated.
The steady state of gross ination rate ss is xed as 1:008 to account for an
annualized long - run ination rate of 3.2%. The calibrated parameters are reported
in table 2.2.
2.6.4 Parameters Estimates
Table 2.3 reports the SMM estimates of the parameters. For a sake of compa-
rison we also report the estimates of the parameters under the restricted model of
homoscedastic shocks. The rst column reports the estimates when the conditional
variances of the shocks follow stochastic volatility processes and the second column
when shock volatilities are constant.
Results under stochastic volatility (in column 1) show that there is evidence of
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time - varying volatility in productivity, preferences and monetary policy shocks.
The estimates indicate that productivity and preferences shocks are very persistent
and volatile. The autocorrelation coe¢ cient of productivity shock is a = 0:948 and
the unconditional standard deviation is a = 0:012. The conditional volatility of
the productivity shock is also very persistent - with an autocorrelation coe¢ cient of
a = 0:8 - and volatile (a = 0:42). These estimates are similar to the estimates
reported in Justiniano and Primiceri (2008).
The preferences shock is highly persistent (d = 0:982) and volatile (d = 0:014).
The conditional volatility is moderately persistent (d = 0:605) and as volatile as
the productivity shock (d = 0:4):
The monetary policy shock has been constrained to an i:i:d: process and the esti-
mated unconditional standard deviation is large and statistically signicant (mp =
0:001). The conditional volatility autocorrelation coe¢ cient is small (m = 0:4) and
not statistically di¤erent from zero but the unconditional standard deviation of the
innovations (m = 0:001) is signicantly di¤erent from zero.
The preferences parameters are in line with those reported in the literature. The
subjective discount factor is  = 0:9926: There is evidence of moderate habit for-
mation (b = 0:57) which is slightly lower than the standard reported value of 0:65.
The estimates of the consumption curvature parameter is  = 1:57. The Epstein
- Zin parameter ' which is crucial for the relative risk aversion is estimated to be
 167 which is higher than the reported value of  194 in Andreasen et al (2013). The
interpretation of a negative Epstein - Zin parameter is that agents prefer to rather
solve today an expected future uncertainty. This implies that any change in expected
future volatility will a¤ect today agents decision. Notice that the elasticity of inter-
temporal substitution (1= = 0:64) is less than one with a very high risk aversion.
The estimates of the Frisch elasticity of labour supply is less than one (1= = 0:15).
The capital adjustment cost parameter estimates is moderate ( = 3:57): The
central bank reaction to deviations of ination from the long - run ination is higher
( = 3:225) than its reaction to deviations of output from the steady state (y =
0:430): The policy rate displays inertia with a moderate short - term interest rate
smoothing parameter of R = 0:67:
Now we turn to compare the results of the estimations under the benchmark
model and under the restricted assumption of constant volatility. In general, the
main di¤erences between the two models reside in the estimates of the risk aver-
sion parameters, monetary policy shocks, and the real rigidities. The Epstein - Zin
parameter under the constant volatility of shocks implies a higher relative risk aver-
sion (' =  199:35). The consumption curvature parameter is also slightly higher
( = 1:79) as well as the habit formation parameter (b = 0:77): The most striking
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di¤erence is on the monetary policy shock. Under the constant volatility case, the
standard deviation of the monetary policy shock is very small (mp = 1:47  10 5)
and not statistically di¤erent from zero. It means in this case that the dynamics
of the model is only driven by productivity and preferences shocks. The di¤erence
between the two set of estimates under the time - varying and constant volatility
outlines the claim by Hamilton (2010) that a conditional variance misspecication
may have a rst order e¤ect on the conditional means.
2.7 Results
We present below the implications of the second - and third-order approximate
solution of the model for interest rates and risk premia and perform some sensitivity
exercises.
2.7.1 Implications for the Term Structure
To understand the implications of the model for the term structure of interest
rates and risk premia we use the third - order approximated solution in (2.44) to
express the interest rates decision rules in the following form :
bi`t = iv [bvt] + 12 i`vv12 [bvt]1 [bvt]2 + 16 i`vvv123 [bvt]1 [bvt]2 [bvt]3 +
3
6

i`v

3
2 [bvt]3 + 1
2
i`
2 +
1
6
i`
3 (2.47)
where bi`t is the log deviation from steady state of the `-period maturity bond in-
terest rate ; bvt = (bxt 1; "t) and bxt 1 is a vector of log deviation of the state variables
from the steady state. When the shocks are symmetric, the last term 1
6
i`
3 = 0
which implies that third order approximation has no impact on the mean of interest
rates since the constant term is equal to the constant term of the second-order ap-
proximation. Notice that bvt includes the time t   1 volatilities of the shocks ( dt 1;
at 1; 
mp
t 1) through the vector bxt 1 as well as their time t innovations. It means that
the time - varying volatilities enter the decision rules as state variables and provide
an additional dynamics to the term structure of interest rates. We now present below
the model implications of the stochastic volatility for the term structure of interest
rates.
First, we compare the prediction of the model with the data by plotting selected
term structure of interest rates moments computed from the model against their
data counterparts in gure 2.1. Panel A plots the model predicted moments against
the data counterparts whereas panel B and C display the unconditional means and
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standard deviations implied by the model respectively. The moments used in panel
A are the unconditional means and standard deviations of interest rates at di¤erent
maturities. The model moments are computed based on 150000 simulated observa-
tions.13All moments are transformed in percentage and annualized. The horizontal
axis is the simulated moments whereas the vertical axis is the data moments coun-
terparts. The selected maturities are the 3m, 6m, 1y, 2y, 3y, 5y, and 10y. Recall that
only the three - month and the ten - year interest rates (the red dots in gure 2.1)
were targeted in the estimation. As panel A of gure 2.1 shows the model was able
to match relatively well the means of the three - month and ten - year interest rates.
However, the model implied standard deviation of the three - month rate is way
higher than its data counterparts (4.45 vs 2.51). In panel B and C the horizontal line
plots the maturity of the bonds whereas the vertical line is the values of the variables
in annualized percentage. As is clear in panel B, the model was able to generate an
upward sloping unconditional yield curve with long - term interest rates higher than
short - term rates on average as in the data. Moreover, the standard deviations (see
panel C) are decreasing across maturities which is also in line with the data. Figure
2.2 plots 4000 observations simulated from the model. It is evident from gure 2.2
that there is a lot of variations in the model generated risk premia and that long -
term interest rates are smoother than short - term rates. In all, the model is qualita-
tively in line with the data with regard to the rst and second moments of the term
structure of interest rates.
Figure 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5 plot the responses of the term structure to a positive one
standard deviation of the levels of the shocks and gure 2.6, 2.7 and 2.8 present
the responses of the term structure to their corresponding volatility shocks. The
horizontal line is the time after a shock hits the economy whereas the vertical axis
measures the response of each variable. The responses to the level of the shocks refer
here to responses of the system to innovations of the level of the shocks keeping
the conditional volatility xed (at their unconditional values) and the responses to
volatility shocks refer to responses of the system keeping the levels of the shocks
unchanged. That is, we examine the responses of the system to rst and second
moments innovations of the shocks.
With regard to the levels shocks, a positive productivity shock entails a decrease
in interest rates at all maturities (gure 2.3). This negative e¤ect is slightly more
pronounced for shorter term rates than for longer maturities at the impact time. It
means that at the impact time the spread between long - term and short - term rates
positive but negligible. Thus this will tend to shift downward the yield curve. The
e¤ect of a positive productivity level shock on risk premia di¤ers across maturities.
13We simulate 200000 observations from which we discard the rst 50000 observations.
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Shorter maturity risk premia slightly increase whereas long - term premia tend to
decrease. However, the order of the magnitude of the impact is small (10 5). On the
other hand, a positive preferences level shock has a negative impact on interest rates
(gure 2.4). Short - term interest rates decrease more than long - term rates. Re-
member, the preferences shock a¤ects directly the consumer intertemporal decisions
and the model pricing kernel. Here at the SMM parameter estimates, a positive pre-
ferences shock leads to increases in the pricing kernel and bond prices which means
a decrease in interest rates. The impact of a positive preferences shock on risk pre-
mia is positive and is increasing with the maturity. Long - term risk premia increase
more than shorter term premia. Notice that compare to the technology level shock
the magnitude of the impact of the preferences level shock is higher. As expected
a positive monetary policy level shock increases interest rates of all maturities and
the impact decreases with maturities as short - term rates increase more than long -
term rates (gure 2.5). The e¤ect vanishes quickly because the persistence parameter
of the policy shock were set to zero in the model. The 6m risk premium responds
negatively to a positive monetary policy shock whereas other maturity premia in-
crease. However, the magnitude of the impact is very small compare to technology
and preferences level shocks.
Now, we examine the e¤ects of the three volatility shocks on the term struc-
ture. As gure 2.6 shows, a positive shock to the conditional volatility of technology
leads to a decrease in short - term rates and an increase in long - term rates. Risk
premia respond positively by increasing and the impact is increasing with the matu-
rity. For example, a one standard deviation increase in the conditional volatility of
productivity leads to a more than 20 basis points (annualized) increase in the 10y
bond risk premium. Notice that this impact is more important in magnitude than
the level shock e¤ects we explored above. As it is also the case for the technology
volatility shock, an increase in the conditional volatility of preferences shock leads to
a precautionary behavior of the consumer as consumption decreases and investment
increases14. However, an increase in the preferences shock volatility leads rather to
a decrease in interest rates and risk premia. Long - term interest rates decrease less
than short - term rates. Remember the risk premium here is the excess holding per-
iod return, that is, the expected return of holding a bond for one - period minus the
current one - period bond yield. Since interest rates decrease it means that current
bond prices increase and future bond prices are expected to increase more than the
current price increases. Relative to the current decrease in the one - period interest
rate, the expected return of holding a bond for a period is higher and thus agents
14See the impulses responses of the macro variables in annexes at the end of the document. Here
we focus only on analyzing the term structure
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demand less risk premium to hold longer maturity bonds. Monetary policy volatility
shock has a negligible e¤ect on the term structure of interest rates and risk premia
as the impact is positive but very small (see gure 2.8).
2.7.2 Risk Premia and Volatility Shocks
In this section, we analyze the implications of the model solution to further un-
derstand how the volatility shocks a¤ect the levels as well as the variance of risk pre-
mia. Since risk premia are compensations for uncertainty, only state variables which
involve exposure to uncertainty enter in their formulae. That is, the risk premium de-
cision rules contain terms that involve cross products of volatilities or innovations and
potentially the other state variables. For example, the second-order approximation
solution will deliver a constant risk premium involving constant structural parame-
ters scaled by the volatilities of the shocks. Thus, the second-order approximation
risk-premium denoted by rp`2rd can be written15 as
rp`2rd =
1
2
rp`;a(a)
2 +
1
2
rp`;d(d)
2 +
1
2
rp`;mp(mp)
2+
1
2
rp`;a(a)
2 +
1
2
rp`;d(d)
2 +
1
2
rp`;m(m)
2 (2.48)
where rp`;d; rp`;a; rp`;mp; rp`;d ; rp`;a ; rp`;m are functions of structural parame-
ters and 2d; 
2
a, 
2
mp are the unconditional volatility of preferences, productivity, and
monetary policy shocks respectively and d ; a ; m are the standard deviations
of their respective innovations. Notice that the rst line of (2.48) is the risk premium
when shocks display constant volatility and the second line take into account the
uncertainty involved in the conditional volatility of the shocks. Thus, compare to the
constant volatility of shocks case, time - varying volatility has a rst order e¤ect and
a¤ects the conditional mean of risk premia. Imsyn this model, the constant volatility
case is obtained by imposing j = 0 where j = d; a m:
At a third - order approximation, risk premia are time - varying as long as the
coe¢ cients gv corresponding to the risk premium decision rules in (2.44) are dif-
ferent from zero. When the volatilities of the shocks display time variation, this adds
more dynamics to the risk premia since the state vector now includes conditional
volatilities. In the case of non-symmetric shocks (g 6= 0), third-order approxima-
tions may a¤ect the level of risk premia. Thus, the model risk premium implied by
a third-order approximation denoted by rp`3rdt takes the form :
15With the perturbation parameter  xed at 1
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rp`3rdt = rp
`2rd +
1
6
rp`;a
3
a +
1
6
rp`;d
3
d +
1
6
rp`;mp 
3
mp+
3
6

rp`;v 

3
hcv ti3 +
3
6

rp`;a
 ba;t 1 + rp`;d bd;t 1 + rp`;m bm;t 1	+
3
6
n
rp`;a

at +
h
rp`
;d
i
dt +

rp`;mp

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o
(2.49)
where rp`3rdt is the time t risk-premium on the `-period bond, rp
`
;a ; rp
`
;d
;
rp`;m ; rp
`
;a ; rp
`
;d
; rp`;m are the third - order partial derivatives of rp
`3rd
t with
respect to 2 and a; d; m; 
a; d; m respectively. v t is the vector of the remaining
state variables in vt excluding a;t 1; d;t 1; m;t 1; 
a
t ; 
d
t ; 
m
t :
This decomposition of risk premium is interesting because it is similar to the
Autorgressive conditional heteroscedasticity in mean (ARCH - M) process in Engle,
Lilien and Robin (1987). It implies that, the conditional volatilities have a direct e¤ect
on the conditional means of the variables. However, there are two di¤erences between
this model and the standard statistical ARCH - M model. First the coe¢ cients in
this model are restricted structural parameters and have economic meaning instead
of free parameters. Second, the relevant conditional volatility in Engle, Lilien and
Robin (1987) is that of the realized risk premium. In this model it is economic
agents expectations about future shocks volatility given time t information. Because
agents are forward - looking in this model, any change in expected future volatility
has an immediate impact on current decision rules and asset prices. Consequently,
this decomposition will allow us to investigate the link between risk premia and
macroeconomic variables as well as structural parameters.
Andreasen (2011), Ruge - Murcia (2010) among others show that the coe¢ cients
rp`;j = 0; j = a; d;m when the innovations of the shocks display symmetric distri-
butions. Since we assume normal distribution for the innovations, these coe¢ cients
are then equal to zero. That means that, third-order approximations will have a
small e¤ect on the size of the risk premium compared to second - order approxima-
tions. Moreover, when the variances of the shocks are constant over time, the risk
premium expression in (2.49) reduces to the rst two lines. The last two lines out-
line the contribution of time - varying volatility to the dynamics of risk premium.
Clearly the dynamics of the risk premium will be driven by the state as long as the
coe¢ cients rp`v 6= 0: Unlike in the second order approximation case, the price of
risk is time-varying at third-order approximation. The dynamics of the price of risk
in this case is driven by the shock innovations and the state variables.
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We now turn to examine how the three volatility shocks contribute to the level
as well as the variations of risk premia at di¤erent maturities at the SMM parameter
estimates. To that end, the coe¢ cients rp`;j; j = d; a; m in (2.49) for di¤erent
maturities ` are plotted along with the unconditional means and standard deviations
of risk premia.
Figure 2.9 explores how these coe¢ cients are related to the unconditional means
and standard deviations of risk premia computed based on 150000 simulated observa-
tions. The horizontal lines of gure 2.9 are maturity and the vertical line the values of
the specied variables. Panel A plots the coe¢ cients associated with the conditional
volatility of the technology shock rp`;a ; panel B the coe¢ cients associated with the
conditional volatility of the monetary policy shock, rp`;m ; panel C the coe¢ cients
associated with the conditional volatility of the preferences shock, rp`;d ; and panel
D the unconditional means and standard deviations of risk premium. In panel D the
blue dotted line (left scale) represents the unconditional means while the green line
(right axis) represents the unconditional standard deviations. It is clear from panel
B that monetary policy conditional volatility plays a limited role in the means as
well as the average of risk premia as its scaling coe¢ cient rp`;m is negligible and is
of order 10 9: Moreover, if there is any contribution of the conditional volatility of
the policy shock, that would involve only very short terms risk premia.
Figure 2.9 suggests that unconditional means and standard deviations of risk
premia are mainly driven by conditional volatilities of productivity and preferences
shocks. The coe¢ cients (rp`;a) associated with the productivity conditional vola-
tility are positive while those (rp`;d) associated with the preferences conditional
volatility are negative for all maturities. It implies that the conditional volatility of
productivity shock contributes positively whereas the conditional volatility of prefe-
rences shock contributes negatively to the averages of risk premia. Notice that the
coe¢ cient rp`;a is increasing with maturity. On the other hand, the coe¢ cient
rp`;d is decreasing with maturity at the short end of the yield curve (from 6m to
2y) and increasing from 2y to 10y maturities. This also suggests that di¤erences in
the means and standard deviations of risk premia across maturities are partly explai-
ned by productivity and preferences conditional volatility. Moreover, the conditional
volatility of productivity contributions to the averages and standard deviations of
risk premia are increasing with the maturity. With regard to the conditional volati-
lity of preferences shock, the averages of risk premium are more negatively a¤ected
from 3m to 2y - maturities. The reverse is true for maturities greater than 2y. The
contributions to risk premia standard deviations is increasing with maturity from 3m
to 2y maturities and decreasing after the 2y maturity.
Now, we explore how changes in some structural parameters a¤ect the means
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and variances of risk premia. The parameters considered are the habit formation
parameter (b), the capital adjustment cost parameter (), the Epstein - Zin parameter
(').
Figure 2.10 plots the averages and standard deviations of risk premia for dif-
ferent maturities obtained by changing the considered parameters from their SMM
estimates. Panel A shows the averages and panel B the standard deviations.
We change the habit formation parameter from the baseline value of 0.57 to a
high level of 0.95 with others parameters set at their baseline values. Habit formation
preferences are known to positively magnify the size of risk premium in endowment
economy. However, this result can be mitigated in production economies (see, Chap-
ter 1). When the capital stock adjustment cost parameter is xed at the baseline
value ( = 3:57) changes in b have a negligible impact on the means as well as the
standard deviation of risk premia. This is consistent with the nding in chapter 1
that the habit formation parameter only has a signicant e¤ect on the level of the
risk premia when the capital stock is xed ( = +1): This result is also true for the
adjustment cost parameter. When the habit formation parameter is xed at b = 0:57,
the adjustment cost parameter has little e¤ect on risk premia. As for the Epstein -
Zin parameter ' remember, it is the key determinant of the risk aversion parameter.
So, increases in the absolute value of ' is expected to have positive impact on risk
premia. We change ' from -167 to -200. As a result, the risk premia increase for all
maturities. The 10y bond risk premia increases by 147 basis points from 1.78% to
3,25%. The standard deviation slightly increases for all maturities.
2.8 Conclusion
This paper studies the term structure of nominal bonds interest rates and risk
premia in a New Keynesian framework with recursive preferences and time - varying
uncertainty. Time - varying uncertainty is introduced by assuming that technology,
preferences and monetary policy shocks conditional volatilities follow stochastic vo-
latility processes. The model is solved by perturbation method which involves taking
third - order Taylor series expansions. Then, the parameters of the model are esti-
mated by simulated method of moments (SMM). The analysis focuses on the e¤ect
of uncertainty shocks on the term structure of interest rates and risk premia.
Introducing time - varying uncertainty in the analysis of the term structure is
important because changes in uncertainty or volatilities have an impact on economic
agents consumption or portfolio decisions. Moreover, previous studies (Rudebusch
and Swanson, 2010, Andreasen et al, 2013) have shown that recursive preferences
are appropriate in analyzing jointly asset prices and business cycles as opposed to
the standard preferences in New Keynesian DSGE literature. Previous work that
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make use of recursive preferences to analyze the term structure have focused on the
impact of the level of the shocks on the term structure (Andreasen et al, 2013) or
have employed time - varying volatility but using an endowment economy framework
(Doh, 2010, van Bingsberg et al, 2010, Binsbergen, Fernández-Villaverde, Koijen,
and Rubio-Ramírez, 2010). Since endowment economy framework implies that the
equilibrium consumption is exogenous, it is important to extend this analysis to a
fully - edged production economy in order to understand the impact of di¤erent
sources of time - varying uncertainty on the term structure.
It is shown that the introduction of time - varying volatility has a rst order
e¤ect and induces an additional dynamics to interest rates and risk premia. In fact,
the conditional volatilities a¤ect the conditional means of the term structure and
contribute to its uctuations. It means that time - varying uncertainty a¤ects agents
decisions and asset prices. This is interesting as the derived risk premia decision
rules mimic the ARCH - M process introduced by Engle, Lilien and Robins (1987).
The main di¤erence here is that the coe¢ cients of our ARCH - M are functions of
structural parameters.
At the SMM parameters estimates, the model generates statistics which are quali-
tatively in line with the term structure data counterparts. Results show that positive
level of productivity shocks have downward shifting e¤ects on the yield curve whereas
positive monetary policy level shocks atten the yield curve and preferences shocks
a¤ect positively the slope of the yield curve.
With regard to the volatility shocks, real uncertainty shocks (technology and
preferences) play the most important role in the level and variations of risk pre-
mia relative to nominal uncertainty shocks (monetary policy). Techonology shock
conditional variance contributes positively to the averages and variances of risk pre-
mia whereas preferences shock conditional volatility contributes negatively to the
averages of risk premia.
As in the simple case of standard preferences and constant volatility in Chapter
1, the impact of habit formation on risk premia depends on whether the capital stock
is xed or not. When the capital stock is xed, a higher habit formation parameter
signicantly increases the risk premium. However when the capital stock is allowed
to vary, increases in habit strength parameter have a little impact on risk premiums.
This is because allowing the capital stock to vary costlessly, open an additional
channel for consumption smoothing.
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Tab. 2.2: baseline calibrated parameters
parameters description value
z long-run growth of productivity 1:0052
 long-run growth of investment shock 1:0016
nss adjustment cost parameter 0:34
 share of capital income 0:33
 depreciation rate 0:02
 elasticity of substitution among goods 11
p proportion of rms not adjusting price 0:75
ss long-run gross ination rate 1:008
73Tab. 2.3: SMM Estimation
Description Symbol Time-varying volatility Constant volatility
Preferences parameters
Discount factor  0.9926 0.9928
(0.0002) (0.003)
Consumption curvature  1.572 1.785
(0.254) (0.325)
EZ param eter ' -167.02 -199.346
(25.02) (30.52)
abour elastic ity  6.612 6.609
(3.79) (3.4)
Habit formation b 0.570 077
(0.0005) (0.0002)
Capital adjust. cost parameter  3.565 3.621
(0.111) (0.371)
Policy rule parameters
AR param eter i 0.663 0.663
(0.0007) (0.0027
Ination reaction co e¤  3.225 3.224
(1.005) (1.255)
Output reaction co e¤ y 0.430 0.430
(0.000) (0.001)
Preferences shock parameters
Persistence param eter d 0.982 0.968
(0.0052) (0.031)
Standard deviation d 0.014 0.014
(0.002) (0.001)
SV persistence d 0.605 -
(0.236) -
Standard deviation d 0.400 -
(0.023) -
Productivity shock parameters
Persistence param eter a 0.948 0.960
(0.0001) (0.0023)
Standard deviation a 0.012 0.008
(0.000) (0.0056)
SV persistence a 0.815 -
(0.0641) -
Standard deviation a 0.420 -
(0.000) -
Monetary policy shock parameters
Standard deviation m 0.0015 1:47 10 5
(0.001) (0.290)
SV persistence m 0.432 -
(0.021) -
Standard deviation m 0.0053 -
(0.0002)) -
Note : Asymptotic standard deviations in parenthesis
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Fig. 2.1: Model Implied Term Structure of Interest Rates
Panel A : Model Fit
Panel B : Unconditional Means of Interest Rates
Panel C : Unconditional Standard Deviations of Interest Rates
75
Fig. 2.2: Simulated Series of the Term Structure
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Fig. 2.3: Responses to Productivity Level Shock
Fig. 2.4: Responses to Preferences Level Shock
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Fig. 2.5: Responses to the Monetary Policy Level Shock
Fig. 2.6: Responses to the Productivity Volatility Shock
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Fig. 2.7: Responses to Preferences Volatility Shock
Fig. 2.8: Responses to Policy Volatility Shock
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Fig. 2.9: Risk Premium and Conditional Volatility E¤ects Coe¢ cients
Panel A : Productivity Volatility Shock rp`;a Panel B : Monetary Policy Volatility Shock rp
`
;m
Panel C : Preferences Volatility Shock rp`;d Panel D : Unconditional Means and Standard
Deviations of Risk Premia
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Fig. 2.10: Sensitivity Analysis
Panel A : Means Panel B : Standard deviations
In each case, the remaining parameters are xed at their SMM estimates
81
Chapitre 3
Monetary Policy and
Heterogeneous Ination
Expectations in South Africa
3.1 Introduction
Prior to the recent nancial crisis, many countries advanced and emerging mar-
ket economies - have adopted ination targeting (IT) as a monetary policy strategy
to address the breakdown of the relationship between money growth rates and in-
ation (New Zealand, Canada and South Africa), or the disappointment following
the use of exchange rates as an intermediate target (United Kingdom, Sweden and
Finland). Most of these countries experienced a sharp decline in ination right after
the adoption of IT. The success of IT is attributed to, among others, the ability of
central banks to anchor expectations of agents around its set targets (see Demertzis
and Viegi, 2008). To achieve this objective, the central bank should clearly commu-
nicate its policy and should aim at further increasing its credibility. It is only in
such an environment that the public would believe that the central bank is resolute
in steering ination towards the o¢ cial target. Then ination expectations will also
converge to the o¢ cial target and are likely to remain unchanged even in the pre-
sence of negative supply shocks such as rise in oil or food prices. In this instance, the
public is convinced that the central bank will act to bring back ination within the
established target band. In that case ination expectations will be tied closely to the
target and the associated output cost of the disination will be lower. It is therefore
crucial to analyze expectations formation of agents in an IT regime and determine
the credibility of monetary policy.
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Many studies have focused on the success of monetary policy in South Africa in
curbing ination in the IT era. For example, Gupta, Kabundi, and Modise (2010),
Kabundi and Ngwenya (2011), Gumata, Kabundi, and Ndou (2013), and Aron and
Muellbauer (2007) nd that the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) has been suc-
cessful in decreasing ination in the IT regime compared to pre-IT periods. The
SARB has achieved single-digit ination for more than a decade, even though there
were two instances (2002 and 2008) where ination has risen to more than 10% due
to the depreciation of the Rand and a rise in food prices. Notice that in these two
instances ination has stayed above the upper bound of the target band for less than
three years. However, all the aforementioned studies are silent about the role played
by expectations in the IT regime, and whether this success was a result of the ability
of the SARB in anchoring expectations within the target band.
The following questions are crucial in determining the role played by expecta-
tions : (i) How does the SARB shape expectations of agents ? (ii) Are these ex-
pectations homogeneous ? (iii) Are perceived targets of agents consistent with its
objective ? (iv) What explains the upward bias of ination toward the upper bound
of the target band ? Kabundi and Schaling (2013, henceforth KS) attempt to ans-
wer these questions using a simple macroeconomic model which estimates ination
expectations as a linear function of ination target and lagged ination. They use ag-
gregate (macroeconomic) ination expectations obtained from the quarterly survey
conducted by the Bureau of Economic Research (BER). Their results indicate that
expectations formation of agents is backward-looking and that the implicit target of
agents lies above the target band of 3 to 6%. This suggests that their expectations
were not properly anchored. However, KS results can be somewhat misleading for two
reasons. First, they assume that economic agents in South Africa are homogeneous.
Aron and Muellbauer (2007) and Reid (2012), using the BER survey expectations
and expectations obtained from Reuters, show that expectations of agents in South
Africa are heterogeneous. The expectations of analysts adjust quickly to the o¢ cial
target band, while expectations of price setters (business and trade unions) adjust
slowly. In general, price setters are somewhat backward-looking owing to the fact that
wage setting in South Africa is backward-looking (Aron et al., 2004). Wage negotia-
tion takes into account past ination instead of future path in ination. According
to Aron and Muellbauer (2007), expectations of price setters eventually converge to
those of analysts within the target band. They conclude that the SARB has been able
to anchor expectations of all agents. Nevertheless, their study covers the sample per-
iod from 1994 to 2004, which misses important dynamics in ination, such as the rise
of 2008 due to exogenous shocks. Second, they work with current-year expectations.
In this paper we extend the KS analysis and decompose aggregate ination expec-
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tations into individual expectations of three types of agents ; businesses, trade unions
and nancial analysts. We use one-year and two-year ahead ination expectations
and a simple macroeconomic model with three key equations, namely, aggregate
supply, monetary policy preferences, and ination expectations. The expectations
equation is estimated with a panel-data regression with xed-e¤ects approach where
expectations of agents are linear functions of the ination target and lagged ination.
The setting is appropriate to deal with heterogeneity observed in the intercepts and
slopes, which in turn enables us to answer some key questions in determining the role
of ination expectations in the conduct of IT in South Africa. Those questions are :
(i) are ination expectations di¤erent across agents (business, trade unions and ana-
lysts) ? and (ii) to what extent do potentially diverging ination expectations imply
di¤erent perceptions of the credibility of South Africas IT framework ? The second
question is important as a regime that is perceived as non-credible, say, by unions
has di¤erent policy implications for the SARB than lack of buy-in from analysts. We
also address the possible dilemma faced by a central bank that is confronted with
non-anchored ination expectations. Should it accommodate those or not ? This is
known in the literature as the expectations trap. We discuss this issue in the context
of our model and suggest a way out.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents an over-
view of the relationship between ination and ination expectations for the aggregate
and each individual agent. It is based on graphical representation of these variables.
Section 3.3 presents the model. We describe the data, their transformation and the
estimation of the model in Section 3.4. We discuss anchoring of expectations by the
SARB and an analysis of the heterogeneity of expectations in Section 3.5. Section
3.6 concludes the paper.
3.2 Ination and Ination Expectations in South Africa : An
Overview
Monetary authorities care about ination expectations because realized ination
itself is partially driven by the publics expectations about future ination. One
channel is that nominal wages are partially set based on expected ination. Ination
targeting was pioneered in New Zealand in 1990, and is now also in use by the
central banks in the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, South Korea , Egypt,
South Africa, Iceland and Brazil, among other countries. The success of the regime
depends largely on the behavior of the publics ination expectations. If ination
expectations are equal to a point target or within the targeting band set by the
central bank, the monetary policy regime is perfectly credible. But if the target or
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band - and thereby the IT framework - is imperfectly credible, long-term ination
expectations will be volatile and transitory shocks to ination will also have an
impact on ination expectations. In a perfectly credible IT framework, long-term
ination expectations should be at and tied to the central banks ination target
level, or at least uctuate inside the target band. In that case any adverse supply
shock which increases the current ination rate would have little e¤ect on long-
term ination expectations because the publics - and thereby wage setters - have
condence in the ability of the central bank to bring down ination back to the
target level - or into the band - over a certain time horizon, where the latter depends
to what extent the central bank engages in exible ination targeting (this term
was introduced by Svensson (1999)). It then appears that the presence of a strong
correlation between long-term ination expectations and the realized ination rate
is a sign of a lack of credibility of the IT regime. The latter is in line with the
theoretical model put forward by King (1996). He emphasizes the role of learning by
the private sector and shows how the optimal speed of disination depends crucially
on whether the private sector immediately believes in the new low ination regime
or not. If they do, the best strategy is to disinate quickly, since the output costs
are zero. If expectations are slower to adapt, disination should be more gradual as
well. Learning by the central bank is addressed by Sargent (1999). He analyzes how
policy makers in the US after World War II learned to believe and act upon a version
of the natural rate unemployment rate hypothesis and creates an econometric model
of an adaptive monetary policy that can produce outcomes persistently better than
the time-consistent one predicted by Kydland and Prescott (1977).
As is common in countries who have adopted an IT framework, the SARB
conducts a quarterly survey on ination expectations to guide its policy. Figure
1 plots the BER ination expectations at di¤erent horizons along with the realized
CPI ination (year-on-year change) from 2000Q3 to 2012Q3. Clearly, ination has
uctuated a lot in 2000Q3-2009Q3 with two big negative shocks in 2002Q4 (due to
massive depreciation of the South African rand) and 2008Q3 (due to increase in
global food price coupled with a rise in oil price and another depreciation of the
South African rand) and a positive shock in 2004Q1 (an appreciation of the rand)
before stabilizing near the upper bound of the target (6%) during the nancial cri-
sis. Below we will look at ination expectations of di¤erent agents, for now we look
at the average across agents. Average ination expectations series closely tracked
actual ination - seemingly with a lag - in 2000Q3-2009Q3 especially in periods
when ination exceeded the upper bound of the band. This suggests that during this
period the shocks discussed above that increased ination also drove up ination
expectations. Thus, from this graphical inspection, it seems that most of the time
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the Reserve Banks monetary policy hardly anchors ination expectations. However,
after the nancial crisis both ination and ination expectations have converged to
the upper bound of 6%. We will provide formal tests for anchoring in the following
sections. Notice that the SARB survey - conducted and published by the BER 
has separate questionnaires for di¤erent societal groups : nancial analysts (inclu-
ding economists), business people, and trade union representatives. Thus, the BER
dataset has a panel structure. This will be used in our empirical work. Note that
the ination expectations series discussed above relates to the aggregate across these
agents.
For policy implementation purposes, it would be interesting for the SARB to
understand whether these groups are homogeneous in terms of their expectations
formation for a number of reasons. First, if there is heterogeneity in expectations, it
may be the case that some groups do not have a good understanding of the IT frame-
work. Identifying these groups may help the SARB with its communication strategy.
Second, trying to inuence ination expectations requires an understanding of the
process by which these expectations are formed. Third, the appropriate monetary
policy response to an expectations shock may di¤er across sectors or agents. For
example, a shock to analystsexpectations may have less potential impact on actual
ination than a similar shock to unions or business expectations. Finally, ination
expectations across sectors or agents may inuence each other because of the rela-
tionship between these two groups. In fact employeeswages are usually negotiated in
advance and are based on expected future prices. Next, rms will set prices according
to a mark-up over marginal cost. For South Africa, research on the determinants of
ination has done by inter alia Fedderke and Schaling (2005) and Fedderke, Kula-
ratne and Mariottti (2007). Both papers nd that the mark-ups in South Africa over
marginal cost are approximately twice that found in the U.S. This may give rise to
a classic wage-price spiral.
In Figure 2, we plot the ination expectations of the three types of agents at
one-year and two-year ahead horizons along with the realized CPI ination rate and
the SARB o¢ cial target range of 3% - 6%. Panel A depicts the expectations of the
analysts, Panel B business expectations and Panel C trade unions expectations. The
ination expectations pattern seems to be signicantly di¤erent across agents. First,
the analystsgroup expectations pattern is relatively at with their two-year ahead
ination expectation within the target band. Second, the business and the trade
unions expectations patterns are very similar and seem to track realized ination
seemingly with a lag - as was the case with the aggregate ination expectations
pattern. Thus, it appears that the expectations of the analysts are well anchored,
whereas those of business and unions are not. It means that the analysis based solely
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on aggregate expectations, such as KS, may lead to misleading conclusions.
3.3 The Model
Kabundi and Schaling (2013) discuss disination policy in South Africa using a
simple macroeconomic model based on King (1996), which combines nominal wage
and price stickiness and slow adjustment of expectations to a new monetary policy
regime. The model analyses the interaction between private sector expectations and
the monetary regime, and in particular the speed at which the ination target implicit
in the latter converges to price stability. It features nominal rigidity and an optimizing
central bank (CB) that trades ination versus output stabilization.
More specic, the model has three key equations : aggregate supply, monetary
policy preferences and ination expectations. Aggregate supply exceeds the natural
rate of output when ination is higher than was expected by agents when nominal
contracts were set. This is captured by a simple short-run Phillips curve1
zt = t   et   t (3.1)
Here t is the rate of ination, zt is the output gap, et indicates the expectation
of ination as the aggregate of the subjective expectations (beliefs) of private agents
and t is a supply (cost-push) shock.
et = 1=3
X
e;it (3.2)
where i = a; b; u (and a denotes the analysts group, b the businesses group and u the
unions group). Those beliefs do not necessarily coincide with rational expectations.2
The model is not restrictive as long as ination expectations are in part inuenced
by past monetary policy (see e.g., Bomm and Rudebusch (2000).3
The regime change is represented by a new ination target , which is announced
to the public (business, unions and nancial analysts) at the end of period t 1. The
new target is lower than the initial steady state ination rate, denoted by 0.
1In their analysis of U.S. monetary policy experimentation in the 1960s, Cogley, Colacito and
Sargent (2005) use a model similar to ours but with unemployment instead of output.
2For a New-Keynesian model where the central bank has a similar incentive structure and private
agents are learning see Bullard and Schaling (2009).
3In the present paper - given expectations - the output costs of disination are constant and
given by the slope of the Phillips curve. Here this parameter is normalised at unity. However, if we
allow the output costs of disination to vary with the ination rate, the central banks incentives
change substantially. Thus, one way of extending the model with state-contingent output costs of
disination would be by means of a non-linear Phillips curve as discussed in Schaling (2004). For a
preliminary analysis along those lines see Hoeberichts and Schaling (2006).
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The central banks objective as of period t is to choose a sequence of current and
future ination rates ftg1t=0 so as to minimize its intertemporal loss
1P
t=0
t
1
2

(t   )2 + (zt)2

(3.3)
where parameter 0   < 1 is the relative weight on ination stabilization, while
0 <   1 is the discount factor.
The timing of events is such that the central bank chooses its disination policy
after private sector ination expectations are set. In the terminology of game theory
the private sector is the Stackelberg leader. In Section 5.4 we analyze the opposite
case.
The above statements can be analyzed more precisely by explicitly considering
the central banks optimization problem (where it takes ination expectations as
given, that is, under naïve discretion). The central banks optimal ination rate - or
Best Response in terms of Sargent (1999) is :4
t =
1
1 + 
(et + t) +

1 + 
 (3.4)
Of course, from (3.4) it is clear that if expectations are slower to adapt, the disina-
tion should be more gradual as well. The ination rate should decline as a constant
proportion of the exogenous expected ination rate.
In a standard New-Keynesian model the Phillips curve is
t = 
e
t+1 + zt + t
and the rst-order condition under discretion is
t =

1 + 2
et+1 +
1
1 + 2
t +
2
1 + 2

where et+1 is the time t expectations of time t+1 ination, that is, 
e
t+1 =
Et [t+1] ; and Et is the mathematical expectation given time t information set ope-
rator.5 This is very similar to the rst order condition of the specication adopted
in this paper if  = 16 since the discount factor 0 <   1 is typically calibrated
4According to the central banks rst order condition monetary policy responds to aggregate
expectations. Thus the heterogeneity of agents is not taken into account in monetary policy. We
leave this for further research.
5Note that Ett+1 = et+1, we will use the latter notation throughout the article when necessary.
6As pointed out by Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000, p. 170) there is no widespread consensus
on the value of the output elasticity of ination, . Values found in the literature range from 0.05
to 1.22.
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at 0.99 (See for example Woodford (2003)). This implementation of exible ination
targeting is what Evans and Honkapohja (2003) call an expectations-based optimal
rule, by construction, it implements what they label optimal discretionary policy
in every period and for all values of private expectations. Here as above the central
bank also chooses its disination policy after private sector ination expectations are
set. The only di¤erence is the timing of expectations (set at time t or t   1) which
has no bearing on our empirical results. What matters is who moves rst, the central
bank or the private sector.
In general, expectations are a¤ected both by the ination target and by actual
ination performance. After experiencing high ination for a long period of time,
there may be good reasons for the private sector not to believe the disination po-
licy fully (See also Bomm and Rudebusch (2000)). In light of this, in this section
following King (1996) we assume that for each agent ination expectations follow a
simple rule, that is a linear function of the ination target and the lagged ination
rate.
e;it+h = 
it 1 + (1  i) (3.5)
where h is the forecast horizon. Put di¤erently, the lower , the better ination
expectations are anchored at long horizons.7 Note that in this case expectations are
neither rational (which would be the case where ination expectations equal the
target as the central bank has no incentive to generate surprise ination) or given by
a rational learning process. For the latter case (of Bayesian learning) Schaling and
Hoeberichts (2010) - for a two-period version of the above model - show that then 
can be interpreted as (1 x1)(1 q). Here x1is the prior probability assigned by wage
setters to the event that the central bank disinates everything in one go (follows
a cold turkey policy) and 0 < q  1 is the fraction of the disination that takes
place in period 1. Thus, with a structural interpretation of  rational expectations
can display some of the backward-looking characteristics of adaptive expectations.
Notwithstanding the above, we stress that the focus of this paper is on the anchoring
of expectations to the ination target (where ination expectations are given by
survey data), rather than on rationality or rational learning. Note that if the regime
switch to the new ination target is completely credible, ination expectations are
immediately anchored by the ination target, that is e;it+h = 
 (we have i = 0).
7For an empirical analysis for the U.S. examining observable measures of long-run ination
expectations, see Kiley (2008). Further our model generates persistent ination (decreasing in a),
although the central bank does not aim for an output target above the natural rate. An alternative
framework that also generates an ination bias is the paper by Cukierman and Gerlach (2003).
Here the central bank aims for the natural rate - as in this paper - but is more concerned about
negative than positive output gaps.
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Conversely, if the regime switch is not credible at all, ination expectations remain
driven by the past ination rate ; e;it+h = t 1 (
i = 1).8 In reality - and in the case
of South Africa - we are likely to nd in between cases. To that end we will now
estimate equation (3.5) for South Africa (for each agent) over the period 2000-2013
e;it+h = c
i + it 1 + "it (3.6)
and "it is the iid stochastic error term which follows a normal distribution. In so
doing, we obtain ^i and c^i, where c^i = (1   ^i)^. Therefore, for each agent we can
easily compute their perceived (implicit) ination target as : ^i = c^
i
1 ^i .
3.4 Econometric and Data Analysis
3.4.1 Econometric Analysis
Fully anchoring ination expectations would mean that ination expectations are
equal to the target and hence completely uncorrelated with realized ination. Then
any shock to ination has a limited e¤ect on ination expectations. One way to
test whether expectations are well anchored is to perform a Granger causality test
between ination expectations and realized ination. If realized ination Granger
causes ination expectations that signals a lack of "anchoredness" as then lagged
realized ination will have an impact on expected ination. We report the results of
this test in our section on the empirical results.
To account for a potential heterogeneity in expectation formations, we exploit
the panel structure of the BER dataset and estimate the following panel model
e;it+h = i0 + 1D
i1
t + 2D
i2
t + 0t 1 + 1D
i1
t t 1 + 2D
i2
t t 1 + "
i
t (3.7)
where i0; i1; i2 2 fa; b; ug, i0 6= i1 6= i2, e;it is a measure of time t ination expecta-
tions of agent i; Dit is a dummy variable taking 1 if the agent type is i and 0 otherwise,
t 1 is lagged realized ination, "it is a time t independently distributed error term of
agent i; and i0 ; 1; 2; 0; 1; 2 are constant parameters: i0 is a reference category
and i1; i2 represent one of the two other categories.
Notice that equation (3.7) nests the equation by equation estimation. That is, for
a given type i, the model is reduced to a regression of agent is ination expectations
on a constant and lagged realized ination. Since we have three agents and the
8Note that if we see the above as a game between the private sector and the central bank then the
formers expectations formation equation can be interpreted as its reaction function. The solution
for ination can be obtained by substituting the latter in the central banks rst order condition :
t =

1+t 1 +
(1 )+
1+ 
.
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analysts group expectations seem to be anchored rather well relative to other groups,
we use the analysts group as the reference category and hence only use the business
and trade unions group dummies in the model. Thus i0 = a and i0 and 0 are
respectively the intercept and the slope coe¢ cients of the analysts expectations
equation. The intercept and the slope coe¢ cients of the type i1 agent are given by
i0 + 1 and 1 + 0 respectively (the corresponding coe¢ cients of the type i2 are
i0 + 2 and 2 + 0 respectively).
This panel framework is interesting in the sense that it allows heterogeneity in
the intercept as well as in the slope coe¢ cients. The advantage is that we are able
to directly test whether there is heterogeneity in the intercepts as well as in the
slope coe¢ cients. As a consequence, we can derive each agents perceived ination
target as in (3.6). For example a Wald test can be used to test heterogeneity in the
intercepts by simply testing the signicance of 1 and 2 while a Chow-type test can
be used to test di¤erences in the slope coe¢ cients.
Since the validity of the above regression requires the series to be stationary, we
employ the Philips-Perron (PP) unit root test as well as the KPSS test developed
by Kwiatowski, Phillips, Schmidt, and Shin (1992) to test the stationarity of the
ination and ination expectations series. In the PP test case, the alternative model
is an autoregression with a constant but no trend. The spectral estimation method
used is the autoregressive spectral (AR spectral) method and the lag truncation is
automatically selected using recursive t-tests. With regard to the KPSS test, we used
the same spectral estimation method (AR spectral) and lag length selection criteria
as in the PP test case. The results of the test are reported in Table 1 and reveal
that the ination and ination expectations series are stationary at the 1% level of
signicance. Except for the trade unionsination expectations, the null hypothesis
of a unit root can be rejected at the 1% level for all series in the PP test case. As
for the KPSS results, the null hypothesis of stationarity cannot be rejected at the
1% level (5% for the aggregate 1-year ahead ination expectations) except for the
business ination expectations rate. However, when we apply a Dickey-Fuller test
based on the generalized least squares (DF-GLS) method, we are able to reject the
null hypothesis of a unit root for all of our series at the 5% level. Elliott, Rothenberg
and Stock (1996) (ERS) show that the DF-GLS test performs well in small samples
compared to existing unit root tests. Since our sample size is relatively small (49
observations), we use the DF-GLS test results and conclude that all of our series are
stationary.
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3.4.2 The Data
In this paper we consider aggregate ination expectations as well as expectations
of three agents : business, trade unions and analysts (including economists). The data
for these expectations are obtained from the BER. The BER conducts a survey in
South Africa where major market participants are asked questions about the prospect
of ination. More specically, the panel is made of 1 061 business people, 40 nancial
sector participants and 25 participants representing the labour market. According to
Kersho¤ and Smit (2002) the BER survey uses the questionnaires of the Reserve
Bank of New Zealand as a guideline. This series is released each quarter.
Realized ination is the quarterly year-on-year percentage change in the headline
Consumer Price Index (CPI)9 and is taken from the SARB.
The sample is from the third quarter of 2000 to the rst quarter of 2013. There
are two main reasons for this sample size. First, we want to examine the dynamics of
ination and ination expectations during the IT regime in South Africa. Secondly,
the BER survey started in 2000, hence there is no reliable series on survey ination
expectations in South Africa before 2000.
3.5 Empirical Results
3.5.1 Anchoring of Ination Expectations
Table 3.2 presents the empirical results of the Granger causality test between
realized ination and aggregate two-year ahead ination expectations as well as the
two-year ahead ination expectations per agent. The null hypothesis of "t does not
Granger cause et" can easily be rejected at the 1% level for the aggregate, business
people and the trade unions representatives groups. This means that lagged realized
ination impacts on the two-year ahead ination expectations of these two groups
as well as on aggregate ination expectations. On the other hand, this hypothesis
cannot be rejected for the analysts group. This conrms the graphical view that
analystsexpectations are well anchored, while business people and workers groups
expectations are not. Since business people and trade unions represent two-thirds of
the sample and tend to report higher ination expectations, it follows that aggregate
ination expectations are driven by these two groups and are not anchored. This is
an important result which has implications for monetary policy implementation as
will be discussed below.
9As a robustness check, we also try the Core CPI ination but the results of the paper are
unchanged.
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3.5.2 Heterogeneity of Ination Expectations
In this section we investigate whether the three groups of agents form their ex-
pectations in a similar way. We start by testing whether the average of the business
and trade unions groups, i.e. i = 1
T
PT
t=1 
e;i
t where i = b; u; are di¤erent from the
analysts group. That is, we estimate (3.7) by Ordinary Least Square (OLS) with the
slope coe¢ cients set to zero and test the signicance of the intercept coe¢ cients 1
and 2: Then we estimate the unrestricted version of (3.7) and test heterogeneity of
the slope coe¢ cients.
Since the reference category is the analysts group, 1 or 2 6= 0 would indicate
heterogeneity10 (relative to the analysts group) in the intercepts. Table 3.3 reports the
results of the restricted model. The F-statistic is signicant at the 1% level meaning
that the null hypothesis of 1 = 2 = 0 is rejected. Since 1 and 2 are positive this
also indicates that business and trade unions groups tend to report higher ination
expectations on average compared to the analysts group. The estimated average
of the one-year ahead ination expectations is 5.51% for the analysts group, and
6.61% (^i0 + ^1) and 6.51% (^i0 + ^2) for business, and trade unions respectively.
On the other hand, a test of 1 = 2 cannot be rejected meaning that on average
business people and trade unions report similar ination expectations. This is not
surprising given the economic relationship between these two groups. Business and
trade unions are price setters and their actions a¤ect each other. Notice that these
results imply that the average ination expectations of the analysts group is within
the SARB target band of 3 - 6% whereas the business people and the trade unions
expectations are outside the band. However, even the analysts group average ination
expectations (5.51%) are near the upper bound of the target and far from the mid-
point of 4.5%. These ndings are problematic from a price stability perspective which
will be discussed in more detail.
Table 3.4 presents the results of the full estimation of (3.7) using the one-year
ahead ination expectations as the dependent variable. Results indicate that past
ination does explain one-year ahead ination expectations but di¤erently across
agents. On average, 62% of the variation of aggregate ination expectations is ex-
plained by changes in past ination.11 Both the intercepts and the coe¢ cients on
lagged ination for business and trade unions are signicant at the one percent of
signicance. Notice that the intercept 1 is not statistically signicant meaning that
10Notice that the OLS estimation with dummies in the intercept yields the same results as the
xed e¤ect concept of the panel data regression.
11However, an agent-by-agent (decomposition) based estimation of (3.7) shows that the explana-
tory power of the regression is lower for the analysts group and higher for the business and trade
unions groups (see Table 5).
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the intercept of the business group (i0 + 1) is not statistically di¤erent from that
of the analysts (i0). The estimate of 2 is negative (-1.11) and signicantly di¤erent
from zero. It means that the intercept of the trade unions group (i0 + 2) is lower
than that of the analysts. Moreover, the lagged ination slope coe¢ cient for the
analysts group (0.11) is lower than for the two other groups (0.43 (0.13 + 0.30) for
business, and 0.50 (0.13 + 0.37) for trade unions). These ndings are in line with the
graphical overview and the Granger causality test. In the next section we will derive
the perceived (implicit) ination target for each agent.
3.5.3 Credibility and Implicit Ination Targets
In this section we derive the estimates of the coe¢ cients i and  in equation
(3.5) from the reduced form estimation of (3.7). Notice that from (3.5) and (3.7) we
have the following identication :
i0 = (1  i0)i0 and 0 = i0 for the analysts group
1 + i0 = (1  i1)i1 and 1 = i1 for the business people group
2 + i0 = (1  i2)i2 and 2 = i2 for the trade unions representatives group
Since the dummy variables version of the model in (3.7) cannot deal with auto-
correlations in the error terms, we do the estimation by agent as in (3.5) in order
to deal with potential autocorrelations in the error terms. Thus, for each group we
have estimates of di¤erent intercepts as well as di¤erent slopes that allows us to infer
their estimated perceived ination target of the central bank by the identication :
^i =
c^i
1  ^i (3.8)
where c^i is the estimated intercept of type i agent. Notice that the lower ^i is, the
more credible the central bank is viewed by group i agents since they put less weight
on past ination and more weight on the central banks ination target.
Table 3.5 contains the results of the estimation. The rst column reports the
results for the analysts group, the second column for the business people, and the
third column for the trade unions representatives group. Results indicate that past
ination does explain one-year ahead ination expectations but di¤erently across
agents. Both the intercept and the coe¢ cient on lagged ination are signicant at
one percent for business and trade unions. However, the explanatory power of the
regression is lower for the analysts group and relatively higher for the business and
workers groups. Approximately 26% of the variation of analysts expectations are
explained. Moreover, the lagged ination slope coe¢ cient for the analysts group
(0.11) is not signicantly di¤erent from zero and is lower than for the two other
groups (0.22 for business, and 0.35 for trade unions). Once again, these ndings
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corroborate with the graphical overview and the Granger causality test. First, the
SARB seems to have a higher credibility among the nancial analysts and experts
group compare to the price setters group (business and trade unions). Thus, the
hypothesis that the SARB has been successful in anchoring price setters(business
and trade unions) group expectations is not supported in that the relevant coe¢ cients
of lagged ination are relatively high and di¤erent from zero.12 In addition, serial
correlation tests reveal that the regression residuals are highly autocorrelated in the
business (0.86) and trade unions (0.72) cases compared to the analysts group case
(0.34). This indicates that all information about ination expectation is not included
in lagged ination, but can be accounted by other factors, e.g. news.
Now we turn to analyze whether there is heterogeneity in the perception of the dif-
ferent agents of the SARBs ination target consistent with the expectations schemes
formulated in (3.6). We then derive the implicit ination target for each agent as gi-
ven by (3.8) in Table 5. The calculated perceived ination targets are 5.41%, 6.77%,
and 6.62% for the analysts group, business people, and the trade unions respectively.
Once again, these results conrm the graphical observation that the analysts groups
ination expectations are relatively well anchored although their implicit target level
(5.41%) is above the mid-point of the SARBs band and near the upper bound of
6%. These are important results for a central bank, such as the SARB, that targets
ination. The results indicate that the ination targeting regime has buy-in from the
analysts but is not seen to be very credible from the perspective of unions who set
wages, and rms who set prices.
More specic, we now know that the lack of anchoring of aggregate ination
expectations (for an analysis of aggregate ination expectations see Kabundi and
Schaling, 2013) is driven by the price setting side of the economy, namely by business
and trade unions, as the nancial analysts groups expectations are relatively well
anchored. However, those expectations have no direct impact on wages or prices. Thus
the SARB should pay more attention to the price setters group in its communication
strategy. It seems as if these two groups do not have a proper understanding of the
SARB policy framework and/or do not see it as credible. Finally, even the nancial
analysts group perceives the SARBs ination target at a level near the upper bound.
Thus, it means that nancial analysts and experts seem to believe and/or understand
the SARB policy but apparently are not convinced that the SARB is aiming for the
mid-point at 4.5%. Perhaps the band is too wide and/or there is no explicit point
target to steer expectations appropriately. This introduces uncertainty in predicting
ination since realized ination can be anywhere in the band.
12The Wald test reject the hypothesis that  = 0 with a p-value of zero.
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3.5.4 Expectations Trap ?
In this section we analyze the empirical relationship between the SARBs optimal
ination rate and the business and workers groups ination expectations.
In this paper optimal monetary policy implies a strategic interaction between the
private sector and the monetary authorities. The central banks optimal ination rate
as derived in (3.4) is a weighted average of its concern about the business cycle (as
proxied by the publics ination expectations) and the central banks ination target.
It is interesting to understand the importance of the publics ination expectations for
the central bank optimal ination, that is, we want to understand how the central
bank reacts to changes in public ination expectations. To what extent does the
SARB accommodate private sector ination expectations ? Our paper is related to
Chari, Christiano and Eichenbaum (1998). Their basic idea is that, under discretion,
policymakers can be pushed into pursuing inationary policies. This can happen
when the private sector, for whatever reason, expects ination. We know from the
earlier part of the paper that this denitely applies to business and labour. Under
these circumstances, the central banker may nd it optimal to accommodate private
agentsexpectations if the cost of not doing so is a severe and/or persistent loss of
output. Chari et al refer to such a situation as one in which the economy has fallen
into an expectations trap. In the context of our model this can be seen from the
central banks rst order condition for the case where 0 < : Then t < et and
zt < 0. In the case of full accommodation we have t = et and zt = 0.
One way to get an idea of the severity of the expectations trap is to estimate
the central banks rst order condition and test whether the coe¢ cient on expected
ination is one (the case of full accommodation).
To that end, we regress the realized CPI ination on the average one-year ahead
ination expectations of business and trade unions. We abstract from the analysts
group because we already know that their expectations are relatively well anchored.
Thus, we estimate the following equation :
t =
1
1 + 
(et + t) +

1 + 

where et the average ination expectation of business and trade unions, that is,
et = 1=2(
e;b
t + 
e;u
t ).
Table 6 presents the results of the regression. After adjusting for autocorrelation
in the residuals, we nd that the intercept is not signicantly di¤erent from zero and
the coe¢ cient of aggregate ination expectations is not statistically di¤erent from
one at the 1% level. When in the expectations trap, a central bank might prefer
ination to temporarily exceed the target if the latter is expected by the private
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sector. So, our empirical ndings support the hypothesis that the SARB may be
caught in an expectations trap.
Chari et al. (1998) investigate alternative institutional arrangements - which in
our case have a direct bearing on the implementation of ination targeting in South
Africa - that can eliminate the possibility of expectations traps. One solution is full
commitment on the part of the monetary authority. Then the central bank minimizes
its preference function subject to the Phillips curve and to the publics expectations
formation equation.13 This is a di¤erent set-up than we have analyzed so far. There
- in game theoretic terms - the private sector was the Stackelberg leader and the
central bank the Stackelberg follower. Now we reverse that order, but using the same
model. This means that now we move a way from the empirics and end with some
theoretical considerations.
This implies the following Lagrangian :14
L = Et
" 1X
=t

 t
2
  (t)2   (t   et)2   t+1+1 et+1   t
#
where et is the state variable, t is the control, and t is the Lagrange multiplier.
15
The solution of this problem (the central banks rst order condition) is :
t = C
e
t
where
C =
1
(1 + ) + 2

2C2 + 1

and C < 1
1+
, where 1
1+
is the coe¢ cient on expected ination in equation (3.4).16
In this case the (optimal) disination under commitment is always faster than under
discretion (which was the previous set-up). Now recall the equation for the agents
expectations formation process in equation (3.5) where if the ination target is less
credible the higher , as then ination expectations remain largely driven by the past
ination rate t 1. According to Proposition 4 of Schaling and Hoeberichts (2010)
the higher  the lower the monetary accommodation parameter C, and therefore the
lower the central banks optimal ination rate. The argument is that the higher , the
13We assume that the central bank has full knowledge of the process of private sector learning, or
in other words we have what Gaspar, Smets and Vestin (2006) call sophisticated central banking.
14For a zero ination target, but results do not depend on that.
15Without loss of generality we have set h = 0, so that expectations look one period ahead.
16For a proof see Schaling and Hoeberichts (2010).
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more leverage the central bank has over ination expectations via past ination.17
Now the central bank no longer treats ination expectations as exogenous variables.
It realizes that those gures are partly the outcomes of its own policy decisions
which imply actual ination gures. This appears to be a subtle di¤erence but it is
fundamental and is of major practical relevance. If ination expectations are partly
driven by past ination, by reducing actual ination quicker those expectations will
be adjusted downwards by private agents closer to the o¢ cial ination target. Lower
ination expectations translate into lower wages and prices (given the mark-up) so
that a virtuous cycle emerges.
Such a policy is also less costly in terms of the output cost of the disination than
under discretion (where the central bank treats ination expectations as given). In
line with the above discussion about commitment Schaling and Hoeberichts (2010)
- using precisely the algebra above - show that a central bank may try to convince
the private sector of its commitment to price stability by choosing to reduce ina-
tion (more) quickly. They call this "teaching by doing". They nd that allowing for
teaching by doing e¤ects always speeds up the optimal disination (which balances
ination and output) and leads to lower ination persistence. This speed result
also holds in an environment where private agents rationally learn about the central
banks ination target using a constant gain algorithm of the Kalman Filter.
3.6 Conclusion
In this paper we have found empirical evidence for South Africa that suggests
that economic agents ination expectations are not fully anchored by the ination
target (which would be the preferred outcome in an ination targeting regime).
We have extended the analysis of Kabundi and Schaling (2013) who focus on
aggregate expectations and are therefore unable to identify which economic agents,
business, unions or nancial analysts drove their results. In this paper we have de-
composed these results and looked at those individual agentsination expectations
based on the BER survey data. We nd that business and unions perceived ina-
tion targets lie outside the o¢ cial target band. This is relevant for monetary policy
as ination expectations of business people and workers may inuence each other
because of the relationship between these two groups. In fact employeeswages are
usually negotiated in advance and are based on expected future prices. Next, rms
17If we assumme that the private sectors expectations about the central bankss ination target
are formed according to the adaptive (rational) learning literature, that is Et 1t = ct 1 = ct 2 +
 (t 1   ct 2) where  2 (0; 1), then one get precisely the same result : a higher gain parameter is
associated with less monetary accommodation. In the limit we reach the Ramsey equibrium where
z = 0 and  =  = 0.
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will incorporate any expected increase in their marginal cost in to their product
prices.
As a consequence the SARB may nd itself in an expectations trap. This is
the case because ination expectations of business and labour - as proxied by their
perceived ination targets of 6.77% and 6.62% respectively - are outside the band.
Thus, when in the expectations trap, the SARB may be pushed to accommodate
ination expectations. This is in fact fully supported by our estimation of the central
banks rst order condition where we nd that the coe¢ cient of aggregate ination
expectations is not statistically di¤erent from one at the 1% level.
In general, the best way out of this trap is to commit to a faster reduction of
ination - as shown by our solution for commitment or "teaching by doing" which in
practical terms may imply moving to a more narrow band which is consistent with
price stability.
Finally, the SARBmay need to further improve the transparency of the framework
and pro-actively signal its concerns about potential inationary pressures - and likely
responses - to unions and business. This would be another operationalization of
commitment with - in the terminology of game theory - the central bank becoming
the Stackelberg leader in the interaction with the private sector.
Prior to the establishment of the European Central Bank such a practice was
regularly followed by the Deutsche Bundesbank, arguably one of the most successful
monetary institutions in the post-World War II era.
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Table 3.1. Stationarity Test of Ination and inations expectations
Test Statistic
Variable KPSS PP
Aggregate
et 0.47
yy -3.35
t 0.06y -7.62
Analysts
et 0.26
y -4.07
Businesses
et -2.02 1.27

Trade Unions
et 1.64
y -1.8
Note : t is the realized CPI ination. The superscripts  and  denote rejection of the
null hypothesis of unit root at 1%, and 5% levels respectively for the PP test whereas the
superscripts y; yy denote the inability to reject the stationarity hypothesis in the KPSS test
Table 3.2. Granger Causality Test
Null Hypothesis F-statistic p-value
Aggregate
et does not Granger cause t 0.47 0.628
t does not Granger cause et 8.76 0.00
Analysts
et does not Granger cause t 1.44 0.25
t does not Granger cause et 0.68 0.51
Businesses
et does not Granger cause t 2.58 0.09
t does not Granger cause et 5.71 0.00
Trade Unions
et does not Granger cause t 0.24 0.79
t does not Granger cause et 12.39 0.00
Note : et is the two-year ahead ination expectations and t realized CPI ination
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Table 3.3. Heterogeneity in Average Ination Expectations e;it+4 = i0 + 1D
i1
t + 2D
i2
t
Parameter Estimate
i0 5.51

(0.13)
1 1.10
(0.25)
2 1.00
(0.27)
R2 0.11
F-statistic 13.29
Note : Standard errors are reported in parentheses. et+4 is the 1 year ahead
ination expectations. ,  denote signicance at 1%, and 5% respectively.
i0 is the analysts group, i1 the business group and i2 the trade unions group
Table 3.4 . Heterogeneity in Slopes and Intercepts :
e;it+4 = i0 + 1D
i1
t + 2D
i2
t + 0t 1 + 1D
i1
t t 1 + 2D
i2
t t 1 + "
i
t
Parameter Estimate
i0 4.71

(0.28)
1 -0.51
(0.48)
2 -1.11
(0.48)
0 0.13
(0.05)
1 0.30
(0.07)
2 0.37
(0.08)
R2 0.62
F-statistic 60.33
Note : Standard errors are reported in parentheses. et+4 is the 1 year ahead
ination expectations. ,  denote signicance at 1%, and 5% respectively.
i0 is the analysts group, i1 the business group and i2 the trade unions group
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Table 3.5. Expectations Formation and Implicit Ination Target by Agent
Explanatory Variables Dependent Variable : e;it+4
Analysts Business Unions
c 4.82 5.28 4.30
(0.39) (0.57) (0.60)
t 1 0.11 0.22 0.35
(0.08) (0.07) (0.09)
ar(1) 0.34 0.86 0.72
(0.16) (0.04) (0.08)
Implicit Target () 5.41 6.77 6.62
R2 0.26 0.86 0.84
Note : Standard errors are reported in parentheses. e;it+4 is the 1 year ahead
ination expectations of type i.  ,  denote signicance at 1%, and
5% respectively . ar(1) is an autoregressive error term.
Table 3.6. Optimal ination Regression
Explanatory Variables Dependent Variable : t
c -0.33
(2.44)
et 0.95

(0.34)
ar(1) 0.83
(0.11)
R2 0.83
Note : Standard errors are reported in parentheses. et is the 1 year ahead
ination expectations of business and trade unions.  denotes
signicance at 1%. ar(1) is an autoregressive error term.
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Figure 3.1. Ination and Ination Expectations : Aggregate
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Figure 3.2. Ination and Ination Expectations of Agents
Panel A. Analysts
Panel B. Business
Panel C. Trade Unions
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Conclusion Générale
Cette thèse est composée de trois essais en macro nance et macroéconomie mo-
nétaire. Lobjet des deux premiers essais était dexplorer la structure à terme des
taux dintérêt dans les modèles de type dynamique déquilibre général. On sest fo-
calisé dans le premier essai à construire un modèle simple dans lequel on a cherché à
comprendre les facteurs et paramètres économiques qui a¤ectent le niveau des taux
dintérêt et des primes de risque. Comme il est di¢ cile de générer une prime de
risque qui est consistante avec les données dans les modèles déquilibre général, il
est couramment assumé que le stock de capital est xe. Ceci a lavantage daider
le modèle à générer un niveau plus élevé de prime de risque. Un autre fait est que
des préférences avec formation des habitudes contribuent à générer une plus grande
prime de risque. Nous relâchons lhypothèse de xité du stock de capital pour analy-
ser la relation entre les paramètres économiques et la prime de risque. Ensuite dans
le deuxième essai, nous utilisons un cadre plus général avec des préférences récur-
sives et des volatilités conditionnelles des chocs qui varient avec le temps. Lanalyse
a été focalisée sur la contribution des niveaux de chocs ainsi que de leurs volatilités
conditionnelles aux primes de risque de di¤érentes maturités. Les travaux précédents
utilisant ces types de préférences dans une économie de production, pour analyser
la structure à terme assumaient que les chocs ont une volatilité constante. Ce qui
présuppose que lincertitude ne varie pas avec le temps alors que lhétéroscedas-
ticité est une caractéristique courante des données économiques et nancières. Le
modèle dans cet essai est résolu par la méthode des perturbations dordre trois et
est estimé par la méthode des moments simulés. Nous montrons que la solution du
modèle implique que la prime de risque peut être représentée par un processus de
type ARCH M avec des paramètres qui sont fonctions des coe¢ cients structurels
du model. En gros les deux premiers essais ont cherché à explorer les rôles relatifs
de diverses sources dincertitude dans la détermination des taux dintérêt et de la
prime de risque. Le troisième essai quant à lui étudie la formation des attentes din-
ation de divers groupes économiques et leur impact sur la politique monétaire avec
une application sur léconomie sud-africaine. Ce sujet est intéressant car les attentes
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dination des agents ont un impact immédiat sur le résultat de lination réalisée
elle-même à travers les négociations salariales et la xation du prix des biens. On
considère trois groupes dagents : les analystes et experts nanciers, les rmes et
les syndicats représentant les travailleurs. Les rmes et les travailleurs étant les plus
grands acteurs de xation des prix dans léconomie, il est primordial pour une banque
centrale de comprendre comment ces deux groupes forment leurs attentes dination
et probablement sil y a un lien entre leurs formations des attentes dination.
Les résultats du premier essai montrent que les chocs de productivité et intertem-
porels jouent un rôle relativement plus important dans la détermination du niveau
de la prime de risque et leurs contributions relatives di¤èrent à travers les maturités
des obligations. Les chocs de politique monétaire contribuent seulement faiblement à
la prime de risque des bonds de maturités très courtes. La contribution des chocs de
productivité au niveau de la prime de risque est la plus importante pour les bonds
de courtes et moyennes maturités tandis que la prime de risque des bonds de longues
maturités est principalement déterminée par les chocs de préférences (intertempo-
rels). Lorsque les agents peuvent ajuster le stock de capital sans coûts, le paramètre
dintensité de la formation des habitudes a un impact très limité sur la prime de
risque ; et lorsquon impose des couts dajustement exorbitants de sorte quà lopti-
mum le stock de capital est xe on assiste à un impact assez élevé de ce paramètre
sur le niveau de la prime de risque comme cest le cas dans les travaux précédents.
Nous interprétons ce résultat par un mécanisme de lissage de la consommation. En
e¤et, lorsque le capital est xe, les agents ont en moins un canal de lissage de consom-
mation et comme les préférences avec formation des habitudes induisent un niveau
daversion au risque plus élevé les agents réclament une plus grande prime de risque
lorsque ce paramètre augmente.
Les résultats du deuxième essai montrent quil y a une évidence de volatilité
stochastique des chocs. Les volatilités conditionnelles des chocs contribuent signica-
tivement aux niveaux et à la dynamique de la structure à terme des taux dintérêt et
de la prime de risque. La volatilité conditionnelle du choc de productivité contribue
positivement au niveau et à la variance des taux dintérêt et de la prime de risque et
ces contributions augmentent avec la maturité. La volatilité conditionnelle du choc
de préférences contribue négativement au niveau et positivement à la variance des
primes de risque. Quant à la volatilité conditionnelle du choc monétaire, sa contri-
bution reste limitée relativement aux chocs de productivité et de préférences.
Les résultats dans le troisième essai montrent que les trois groupes dagents
forment di¤éremment leurs attentes dination et ne perçoivent pas la politique mo-
nétaire de la banque centrale sud africaine (SARB) de la même façon. Le groupe
des analystes et experts nanciers ont leurs attentes dination arrimée à la bande
106
dination cible (3% - 6%) de la banque centrale alors que les attentes du groupe
des rmes et des travailleurs ne sont pas arrimées et sont attentes similaires. Nous
interprétons ces résultats en termes de crédibilité de la banque centrale au vu des
di¤érents groupes. Ainsi les analystes nanciers croient à la capacité de la banque
centrale de contrôler lination dans la bande de 3% 6% alors que le groupe des
rmes et des travailleurs ny croient pas totalement. Le niveau de crédibilité de la
banque centrale est donc plus élevé chez les analystes nanciers que chez les rmes et
les travailleurs. Ceci est intéressant quand on sait que récemment la SARB a eu des
problèmes pour contenir lination dans la bande cible. Le groupe des rmes et des
travailleurs est celui qui a la plus grande inuence sur lindice des prix à travers les
négociations salariales et la xation des prix. Par conséquent, nous recommandons à
la SARB de cibler ce groupe de xeurde prix dans sa stratégie de communication.
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Annexes
3.1 Appendices for Chapter 2
3.1.1 Appendix 1 : Unit Root Test
Tab. 3.1: Unit Roots Test
Test Statistic
Variable ADF PP
Growth Rate of GDP -6:435  9:242
Growth Rate of consumption -4:369  8:95
Growth Rate of investment -5:59  7:95
log of hours worked -6:39  6:90
Rate of Ination  2:102  3:148
Interest Rates Spread 10 year - 3 month  3:854  4:274
10 year risk premium  4:854  7:274
Note : ; indicate signicance at the 1%, 5% levels, respecively.
3.1.2 Appendix 2 : Model Moments at the SMM Estimates
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Tab. 3.2: Model Fit
Data SMM
Means
yt  400 2.183 2.215
ct  400 2.010 2.217
xt  400 2.316 3.035
t  400 4.303 3.245
log ht  100 -108.310 -107.830
i1t  400 5.512 5.281
i40t  400 6.790 6.786
rp40t  400 1.781 1.695
Standard deviations
yt  400 3.322 4.153
ct  400 2.236 2.527
xt  400 8.648 9.14
t  400 2.943 4.204
log ht  100 1.520 2.052
i1t  400 2.525 4.501
i40t  400 2.361 2.587
rp40t  400 23.704 14.27
First order autocorrelation
yt  400 0.260 0.127
ct  400 0.437 0.502
xt  400 0.495 0.380
t  400 0.816 0.933
log ht  100 0.922 0.960
i1t  400 0.930 0.974
i40t  400 0.968 0.967
rp40t  400 -0.047 0.001
Second order autocorrelation
yt  400 0.224 0.014
ct  400 0.233 0.239
xt  400 0.405 0.051
t  400 0.737 0.900
log ht  100 0.822 0.936
i1t  400 0.886 0.943
i40t  400 0.940 0.936
rp40t  400 0.066 0.245
Note : Model moments are computed based on 50,000 si-
mulated observations
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3.1.3 Appendix 3 : Impulses Responses of Macro Series
Fig. 3.1: Responses of Macro Variables to shocks
Responses to ua Responses to ud
Fig. 3.2: Responses to Monetary Policy Shocks um
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Fig. 3.3: Responses of Macro Variables to Volatility Shocks
Responses to Productivity Shock Volatility Responses to Preferences Shock Volatility
Fig. 3.4: Responses to Monetary Policy Volatility Shock

